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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE DEATH OF THE FLYING WING : THE REAL REASONS 
BEHIND THE 1949 CANCELLATION OF 
NORTHROP AIRCRAFT'S RB-49 
By 
Francis J . Baker 
Claremont Graduate School : 1984 
In an interview aired over the Public Broadcast i ng 
System in 1980 , aircraft manufacturer John K. Northrop made 
a stunning charge. Referring to the Air Force's 1949 can-
cellation of his Flying Wing aircraft, Mr. Northrop alleged 
that the cancellation was not the result of any valid 
concerns about the aircraft itself, but rather was a 
retaliation for his refusal to agree to aB improper demand 
by the Air Force . Specifically, Mr. Northrop charged that 
then-Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington ordered him 
to merge his firm with Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corpora-
tion, and that when he refused, an 88 million dollar con-
tract for the Flying Wings was cancelled. Mr. Northrop also 
admitted that in 1949 testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee, he had perjured himself by denying that 
Mr . Symington had ever threatened or retaliated against 
Northrop Aircraft, Incorporated . 
This dissertation began as a study of ethics and de-
cision-making in the military procurement process. However, 
in-depth research revealed no improprieties in the Air 
Force ' s Flying Wing acquisition program. Research tech-
niques included careful study of voluminous Air Force 
records , most housed at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif-
ornia , and at the Air Force Historical Research Center in 
Montgomery , Alabama . These documents, once secret but now 
declassified, showed that military decision- makers were 
never sat isfied with the Northrop plane, and regularly made 
their position clear to Northrop . The author ' s document 
searches were augmented by a series of interviews held with 
as many of the surviving participants as possible: Senator 
Symington, who vehemently denied any impropriety ; Gen . 
Curtis E . LeMay, then Commander of the Strategic Air Command 
(SAC), who readily admitted that he never wanted the 
Northrop plane and argued against it (and for the competing 
B-36 bomber) before a board of senior Air Force officers 
just before the cancellation; Gen . Lauris 0 . Norstad, the 
sole surviving member of that senior off icer' s board, who 
vigorously rejected any suggestion of improper behavior by 
Senator Symington in this or any other procurement decision. 
An interview with the current Chairman of the Board of 
Northrop corporation, Thomas V. Jones, generally supported 
Senator Symington, and clarified the stand of today's 
Northrop management . In addition, the author interviewed 
and corresponded with the two Air Force chief test pilots on 
the Flying Wing; both men gave valuable insights into the 
technical performance of the Northrop aircraft. 
If political manipulation was not the cause of the 
1949 cancellation, what was? The research uncovered four 
factors that were involved . First was the substantial 
improvement in the competing B- 36, which made great strides 
in late 1948. Second was the assignment of General LeMay as 
SAC commander in October 1948; unlike his predecessor, Gen-
eral LeMay was a strong backer of the B-36, and was willing 
to give up other weapon systems ( l ike the Flying Wings) to 
get more of the Consolidated-Vultee B-36s. Third was 
President Truman ' s cuts in the Fiscal Year 1950 defense 
budget, which caused the Air Force to not only defer the 
addition of eleven planned combat units, but also to 
eliminate eleven others (of a total of fifty-nine) already 
in existence. Finally, the shortcomings of the Flying Wing 
were certainly numerous and significant enough to argue 
against its production and procurement. 
After refuting a number of the allegations made in the 
1980 broadcast, the dissertation concludes with some impli -
cations for management . Chief among these is the need to 
maintain a marketing orientation , that is , the requirement 
to emphasize what the customer requires , rather than what 
the producer wants to build . The Flying Wing was Mr . 
Northrop ' s lifelong dream, and the author argues that its 
production was more related to what Mr . Northrop wanted to 
build than to what the Air Force needed to acquire . 
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PREFACE 
The reader will soon notice that the perspective of 
this dissertation tends to be an Air Force one . The view-
point of the Northrop participants has been extensively 
reported, not only in the 1980 interview of Mr. Northrop and 
his associates, but in other forums as well. This disserta-
tion will cite the numerous books and articles that have 
been written about the Flying Wings : most are unabashedly 
pro-Northrop, and do not present the Air Force side of the 
controversy . Likewise, some of the participants, most 
notably Mr . Northrop and his test pilot Max Stanley, have 
actively spoken out on behalf of Mr . Northrop's position : 
those speeches have not always looked objectively at all 
facets of the Flying Wing program. 
By contrast , the Air Force viewpoint has been largely 
ignored . This dissertation is an attempt to uncover those 
previously overlooked perspectives, through a scientific 
study of the available evidence. Previously classified Air 
Force documents tell of the many serious concerns which 
motivated the military decision-makers. Interviews with 
many of the surviving Air Force leaders, and with both of 
the Air Force ' s Flying Wing test pilots, provide corrobor-
ating evidence. In addition, comments by current Northrop 
Corporation management lend support to the dissertation's 
ix 
conclusions . The combination of these sources provides a 
complete history of the Flying Wing program . 
X 
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INTRODUCTION 
December of 1980 saw the airing of an interview over 
the Pub lic Broadcasting System which r eopened a controversy 
which had been dormant for thirty years . In the interview, 
John Knudsen Northrop, a n aircraft designer and manufactur -
er, charged that his successful "Flying Wing " aircraft 
design had been cancelled in retaliation for his refusal to 
knuckle under to demands by the Secretary of the Air Force 
that he merge his firm with a larger, more favored aviation 
conglomerate . For some in the aviation industry, the 
interview merely conf irmed long-held beliefs ; others saw it 
as a shocking revelation about governmental power plays ; a 
few thought it was a one-s ided , biased slam at a distin-
guished public servant , who in his career was the first 
Secretary of the Air Force , a United States Senator , and 
even , for a while , a candidate for the Democratic 
presidentia l nomination in 1960 . 
This dissertation started as a study of ethics in 
manager ial decis ion-making, a study of a weapon sys tem 
acquisition gone awry, a good aircraft design abruptly 
terminated by a political power play. The cancellation had 
long term effects: for e xample , NASA recently confirmed the 
design as an efficient one for a cargo transport , and the 
shape is also the basis for the highly- classified " stealth" 
1 
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aircraft, expected to be invisible to radar . 
Some dissertation studies take unexpected turns as the 
research unfolds, and this is one of them. My research has 
shown that the cancellation of the Northrop Flying Wing was 
neither arbitrary nor political, but based on a number o f 
valid considerations. In addition, there was one man who--
perhaps more than any other - - was responsible for the choice 
of the Convair B-36 bomber, and the resulting cancellation 
of the Northrop Flying Wing. But he was not the man accused 
by Mr. Northrop; instead , he was the man who was then the 
Commander of the Strategic Air Command, and who would have 
had to use whichever bomber was selected . The results of 
extensive interviews with him and others involved in the 
decision were among the considerations which led me to alter 
my original ideas. 
If political chicanery was not to blame for the death 
of the Flying Wings , what was? The answer can be found in 
the lessons of marketing. We will see that such basic 
marketing precepts as the need to focus on the customer, 
emphasize product utility, and be aware of buyer behavior, 
never seemed to enter the realm of Northrop's selling 
efforts . Rather than being guided by what the customer 
needed , Northrop focused on the product it wanted to 
produce, and then tried to push that product on an unwilling 
buyer . 
An unusual topic, fraught with charges and counter-
charges , with some participants no longer alive and events 
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covering thirty years and more , requires an unusual format . 
In the first chapter I will recount, in some detail, the 
charges made by Mr . John K. Northrop , and corroborated by 
his Chairman of the Board, Mr. Richard w. Millar . In the 
next several chapters, I will discuss the history of the 
Flying Wing programs , and also the relationship of those 
programs to the competing B-36 . Following chapters will 
deal with what I believe will show to be the real reasons 
for the cancellation. Finally, after a chapter which 
counters many of the claims made in the Public Broadcasting 
System documentary, I will conclude with implications for 
management and marketing derived from the Flying Wing 
experience . 
CHAPTER I 
THE CHARGE 
In October of 1979, reporter Clete Roberts of the 
Public Broadcasting System station KCET-TV interviewed John 
K. Northrop, founder of Northrop Aircraft Corporation. 
Fourteen months later, after delays generated by the need to 
gather additional material and by a postponement request 
from Mr . Northrop, the interview was aired as a KCET 
documentary entitled "The Flying Wing--What Happened to 
It? " 1 What Mr. Northrop had to say in the interview re-
opened what for many of those involved was an emotional 
issue that had remained dormant for more than thirty 
years . 2 
In the fil med interview , it was quite clear that the 
then 85-year-old Mr. Northrop was not in good health . His 
appearance was frail, his eyes watery, and his voice 
halting . But the viewer was left with the feeling that Mr . 
Northrop's mind was still sharp and his convictions strong , 
and he presented his case clearly a nd forcefully, as he to ld 
Mr. Roberts of the 1949 cancellation of his lifelong dream , 
the Flying Wing . Because of the significance of Mr . 
Northrop ' s charge , his statement deserves to be quoted at 
length : 
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Well, it's a very strange story and perhaps diffi -
cult to believe, but it certainly is seared into my 
memory, and I'm quite sure I can give you the 
absolute facts as they occured . 
. The same.d~y that ~en3ral McNarney who was the 
ch~ef--the m~l~tary ch~ef --of the Air Forces, came 
to my office with that additional order for thirty-
five airplanes, which he said was a drop in the 
bucket as far as the ultimate order was concerned, 
Mr. Millar and I were requested to visit Mr. 
Symington . At that meeting, he lectured us rather 
lengthily on the difficulties of a Secretary for 
Air in keeping things in hand, and told us that he 
did not want to sponsor any new aircraft companies 
entering the business and having to be supplied with 
business over the years, and that he wanted us with-
out question to merge with Consolidated Vultee, which 
was then operating a government-owned plant in Fort 
Worth, building the B-36, as a competitor to the 
B-35 or B-49 [Northrop's Flying Wing bombers] . 
After the lengthy diatribe on Mr . Symington 's 
part, I said , "Mr. Secretary, what are the alter-
natives to this demand you're making of our merger 
with Consolidated Vultee? " He said, "Alternatives? 
You'll be goddamned sorry if you don ' t !" 
General McNarney said, "Oh , Mr. Secretary , you 
don ' t mean that the way it sounds," and Mr. Symington 
said, " You ' re damned right I do! " 
Well, this was a ~ather staggering termination 
of the meeting . .. . 
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Interviewed for the same broadcast, Richard W. Millar, 
who in 1948 had been the Northrop Board Chairman, corrobor-
ated Mr. Northrop ' s story: 
We were in effect directed to negotiate or work out 
a merger with Northrop and Convair . Jack Northrop 
asked the question , "What if we don't merge? " and Mr. 
Symington was quick to reply that we ' d " be damned 
sorry if we didn't ." We were told to get together 
with Mr . Odlum to work out a basis for the merger. 
I might say parenthetically that when Mr . Symington 
said in effect that we must do it, and we ' d be sorry 
if we didn't, General McNarney spoke up and he said , 
as I recall , " Mr . Symington, you don ' t mean that , do 
you? " and Mr . Symington sa~d in effect that, "Yes , 
you're damned right I do . " 
The merger allegedly demanded by Mr . Symington never 
came about . Mr . Northrop and Mr. Millar both indicated that 
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they visited Floyd Odlum, then President of Convair's parent 
company, but that talks broke off because the two sides 
could not agree on terms . According to Mr. Northrop, it was 
shortly after the merger talks broke off that he received a 
telephone call from Mr . Symington : 
I got a telephone call a few days later from Mr . 
Symington. He said, " I am cancelling all your Fly-
ing Wing aircraft . " And I said , " Oh , Mr. Secretary, 
why? " And he said , "I've had an adverse report ," 
and hung up . That was the last time I ever talked 
to him , and the l ast ti~e we could ever reach him by 
phone or any other way . 
Mr. Northrop went on to claim that the money which was 
to be used to purchase the Flying Wing then went instead to 
Convair, and was used to purchase more copies of the rival 
B-36 . 
MR . ROBERTS: Did he give the contract to someone 
else? 
MR . NORTHROP : He continued the construction of the 
B-36 by Consolidated Vultee in Fort Worth . 
MR . ROBERTS: So , in fact, the contract was taken 
from you , and given t o Consolidated because you had 
refused to merge with Consolidated, as you were 
ordered to do by t he government, is that accurate? 
7 MR . NORTHROP : That is abso lutely accurate . 
The picture painted by Mr . Northrop, and corroborated 
by Mr . Millar, is one of a rash and seemingly corrupt 
decision , made all the more brutal by the way the judgment 
was handled . But if Mr . Northrop believed he was unfairly 
treated , why did he testify otherwise at a 1949 House Armed 
Services Committee investigation? When asked by Mr . Joseph 
Keenan, General Counsel to the Committee, whether Mr . 
Northrop believed there were political implications in the 
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Flying Wing cancellations , he answered in a strong manner : 
MR . NORTHROP : I believe there were none . I can't 
conceive of there being any . 
MR . KEENAN : And you make that statement under oath 
before this committee? 
MR . NORTHROP : I do, sir . 
MR . KEENAN : Genuinely believing it? 
MR . NORTHROP : I certain l y do . 
MR . KEENAN : And not because you are in fear of 
reprisals? 
MR . NORTHROP : No sir, I am not in fear of re-
prisals. 
But persistent rumors about forced mergers between 
Convair and other manufacturers caused the Committee Counsel 
to press further . A few minutes later , Mr . Northrop was 
questioned yet again by Mr . Keenan : 
MR . KEENAN : Have you any knowledge that either your-
self as president or any officer or anyone else con-
nected with Northrop Corporation being informed [sic] 
that unless Northrop agreed to merge with Consolidated 
that business would be bad for Northrop? 
MR. NORTHROP: I have no such knowledge . 
MR . KEENAN : Has anyone ever said anything from which 
you could draw such an inference? 
MR . NORTHROP: No , sir. 
MR. KEENAN : Specifically did Mr . Odlum ever say that? 
MR . NORTHROP : No, he did not . 
MR. KEENAN : Or Mr . Symington? 
. 9 MR . NORTHROP : No , s1r . 
So in 1979, thirty years after his dramatic 1949 
testimony, Mr. Northrop changed his story, contradicting his 
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sworn statements before the House Armed Services committee. 
Mr . Roberts asked Mr . Northrop about his reaction to his 
1949 testimony, in light of his 1979 reversal . 
MR . NORT~ROP : My reaction is that, under pressure 
of t~e l1fe or death of Northrop Corporation, I 
comm1tted one of the finest jobs of perjury that 
I've ever heard . 
MR. ROBERTS : You did not tell the truth . 
MR. NORTHROP : I did not tell the truth . 
MR. ROBERTS : And the reason for doing that was . 
MR . NORTHROP : The reason for doing that was fear of 
the Secretary--the Air Secretary, Mr. Symington--
fear of his complete obliteration of Northrop Air-
craft Corporation . 
MR . ROBERTS : How does it happen, Mr . Northrop, that 
for thirty- one years this story has not been told? 
MR . NORTHROP : The reason ... is the same as the 
reason for my initial perjury, and it was the fear 
. . . that any intima tion of this circumstance would 
result in a r8mplete cancellation and obliteration of 
the company . 
Once again , Mr . Millar was able to corroborate Mr . 
Northrop ' s story : 
... the meeting with Mr . Symington was so , sha l l I 
say , brutal . . . barefaced ... so obviously , if 
you will , a powerplay that you almost had to assume 
that he would be prepared to take further ste~I if 
we didn ' t go as good boys and go along .... 
Mr . Roberts claimed that he tried to contact former 
Secretary Symington , and offered him an opportunity to 
respond to the charges of Mr . Northrop and Mr. Millar. Mr . 
Roberts said that Secretary Symington declined , saying 
only--through his secretary--that he " never did that sort of 
th . 11 12 1ng. 
With General McNarney and Mr. Northrop now dead , Mr. 
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Millar refusing any further comment, and Senator Symington 
silent until now, the reasons for the cancellation have 
remained a source of disagreement. Reporter Clete Roberts 
acknowledged this in his emotionally charged conclusion: 
The question might properly be asked, "How much has 
military aviation in America been set back by the 
destruction of the 'Flying Wings'?" One has the 
feeling that only the surface has been scratched in 
the story of the B-49 'Flying Wing' . The disturbing 
fact remains that a revolutionary aircraft design 
was apparently short- circuited in the development 
program of American aviation , a design that, in the 
words of NASA, has only recently been rediscovered, 
and might well represent the next form of large 
cargo aircraft. There are overtones of politics and 
big business power plays that appear to have affect-
ed the product of the genius of John Knudsen 
Northrop. The B-49--the i[lying Wing'--now little 
more than a memory .. . . 
Summary 
The charges were dramatic , and it appeared that Mr . 
Symington elected to refrain from a strong , on-camera re-
futation. But this dissertation will show that, for what-
ever reasons, Mr. Northrop's charges have the effect of 
trying to make a very complex situation overly simplistic, 
and the KCET documentary did not help to clarify the issue. 
There were unquestionably valid concerns which contributed 
to the cancellation of the Flying Wing, not one of which was 
even mentioned in the KCET-TV i nterview. Later chapters 
will address each of those contributing concerns, but first 
it is necessary to cover the lengthy and complex history of 
the Northrop Flying Wing program . 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS : 1928-1944 
The Northrop Flying Wing bombers did not suddenly 
burst forth, fully developed in the late 1940s. Rather , the 
Wings had their roots in developmental programs begun twenty 
years before , eventual l y growing from small, wooden test 
aircraft to the giant, eight-jet YB-49 that would awe the 
aviation industry just after the Second World War. 
Like all developmental aircraft, the early Flying 
Wings suffered from their share of problems. It is signi-
ficant, though, that unlike other programs in which the 
"bugs " are eventually corrected , the flaws affecting the 
Wings were most persistent . In fact, this chapter will 
highlight several problems plaguing the early Flying Wings , 
problems that caused cancellation of most of the B-35 
bomber production program in 1944, and which would haunt 
the subsequent YB-49 effort in the Post-War years . 
Genesis 
The saga of the Northrop Flying Wings began in 1928 , 
when his desire to experiment with radically new aircraft 
designs led John Knudsen Northrop to leave the Lockheed 
Aircraft Company , and to form his own corporation . His new 
firm--Avion Corporation of Burbank, California--began to 
11 
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experiment in a number of areas, including the study of all -
wing designs. This led to the fabrication of the very first 
Northrop Flying Wing, which made its maiden flight at 
Burbank in 1929 . 1 
This first Flying Wing was not actually an all-wing 
aircraft , since stability requirements demanded that 
Northrop include two outrigger-type booms which connected to 
t h e tail control surfaces . Northrop explained that he saw 
the half-radical, half - conventional design as a necessary 
evil : " We didn't dare go the whole way and eliminate the 
tail. " 2 But, as with the giant Wings which would follow 
in the next two decades , the crew compartment, engine , and 
fuel tanks were buried within the Wing's thirty- foot, six-
inch span . 
The prototype Flying Wing , identified as "X 216H ", made 
a number of flights in 1929 and 1930, most at Muroc Dry 
Lake , California . (Muroc would later be renamed Edwards Air 
Force Base, in honor of an Air Force test pilot killed in a 
1948 crash of a Flying Wing bomber.) But while the X216H 
program was a technical success, it was soon sidetracked by 
h . 3 t e Great Depresslon . United Aircraft and Transporta-
tion Corporation absorbed Northrop's Avion (renaming it 
Northrop Aircraft Corporation) in 1929, and by 1932 was 
pushing for a merger between Northrop and United ' s Stearman 
Aircraft subsidiary in Kansas . John Northrop balked at the 
idea of a merger, just as we will see that he did again 
sixteen years later, and broke with United, forming a new 
13 
Northrop Corporation . But as before, Northrop was a small 
part of a larger enterprise ; this time, the controlling 
force was Douglas Aircraft, which owned fifty-one percent of 
Northrop stock . 4 
During the 1930s , Northrop developed a number of new 
aircraft designs. New Flying Wing concepts were studied, 
but no new aircraft of the type were built . In 1938 , 
Northrop's dependence on Douglas was underscored when his 
corporation was again renamed, this time changing from the 
Northrop Corporation to the El Segundo division of Douglas 
Aircraft . Within a year, Jack Northrop pulled out of 
Douglas Aircraft entirely, starting still another new firm : 
Northrop Aircraft, Incorporated . Total employment stood at 
six : Northrop himself was president, as well as head of 
. . d h 5 eng1neer1ng an researc . But he was on his own--free 
to experiment and innovate , free to design his own aircraft 
rather than produce someone else ' s components. And one of 
the first designs to emerge was a new and more radical ver-
sion of X216H: the N-1M Flying Wing . 
The N-1M 
6 The N-1M (which stood for ~orthrop-Model l ~ockup) 
started life not on the drawing board of an aeronautical 
engineer , but in a completely different--and far less con-
ventional--environment : 
The N-1M . .. was built in wooden mockup form which 
made possible many changes in shape during the test-
ing processes . One major problem was how to obtain 
directional stability, and how to get the effect of 
fins and vertical surfaces without actually having 
them protrude from the wing surface . 
The answer took shape when Mr . and Mrs. Northrop 
were guests of Moye Stephens, then the company's 
secretary, at the latter's ranch home one rainy week-
end. The group was unable to take a planned hike, 
because of the weather, so stayed indoors and exper-
imented with paper airplanes. 
These paper models at first were in the conven-
tional schoolboy's pattern, but later were folded 
into shape much like that of the Flying Wing . Tips 
of the wings were bent up and down and with each 
change the paper planes were "flown". Soon it was 
found that a downward bend of thirty-five degrees 
gave the best performance . . . . This seeming 
child ' s play actually resulted in valuable7data and, later at the plant, was put into practice. 
Tests in the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
wind tunnel confirmed the effectiveness of the drooped 
wingtips, and they were incorporated in the full-scale 
aircraft . 8 
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In May of 1940, the completed N-1M was painted bright 
yellow, and then secretly trucked by night from Hawthorne to 
the Army Air Corps test base at Muroc. The first flight 
came two months later on July 3rd, and the exact circum-
stances of the flight are still somewhat in question . 
Official Northrop documents are in accord with this comment , 
made by company test pilot Max Stanley in 1980 : 
On July 3rd, it accidentally made its first flight. 
The pilot, Vance Breese, while making a high speed 
taxi run, hit a rough spot on the lake bed . The 
airplane bounced about ten feet in the air, flew 
straight and level for a few hu~dred yards, and then 
settled back onto the lake bed. 
But another report tells a somewhat different story, a 
story which hints that perhaps not everyone fully shared Mr . 
Northrop's faith in his design : 
. . . the magazine Time reported that " it looked 
like a ruptured , weather-racked duck , too fatigued 
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to tuck in its wings." Pilot Vance Breese tried 
taxying [sic] and then, on July 3, cautiously lifted 
off and held the yellow wing as close to the ground 
as he could--as someone said, " to make the crash a 
bit easier . " Northrop's comment was, "It looks like 
we have an airplane with a twenty-foot ceiling. " 10 
Whether the first flight of the N-1M was accidental or 
merely prudent, the aircraft went on to complete an extreme-
ly successful flight test program. There were no serious 
accidents, and, with the exception of engine cooling 
problems, no major technological difficulties . In more than 
two hundred flights, pilots Breese and Moye Stephens ex-
plored the whole design envelope of the N-1M, including 
stalls and spins, and in so doing proved the Flying Wing to 
b l bl d . . d . 11 e a va ua e an prom1s1ng es1gn. 
The First Flying Wing Bombers: The XB-35 
With the all-wing principle validated by the success-
ful test program of the N-1M, Jack Northrop turned his 
attention to larger aircraft. On May 21 , 1941, he wrote a 
Confidential letter to Col. Howard Z. Bogert of the Army Air 
Corps Materiel Division at Wright Field. In the letter , Mr. 
Northrop first raised the prospect of a l arge Flying Wing 
bomber: 
. we have made very successful and encouraging 
flights of the flying mockup (N-1M) and I believe 
the time is here ~hen we can s7rious~y c2~sider 
building bomber a1rcraft to th1s des1gn . 
Just two days later, Mr. Northrop again wrote to 
Colonel Bogert, saying that the performance specifications 
had been clarified by a visit from Brig . Gen. Oliver P . 
Echols, Commander of the Air Materiel Command: 
General Echols indicated that a high speed of 400 
mph and a bomb load of 5,000 pounds was what was 
desired, wit~ all additional performance we might be 
able to ~bta2n to be devoted to increasing the range 
of the alrplane . . . . We believe we could carry 
between 10,000 and 15,000 pounds of bombs for 5 000 
miles ... . However, we have made no accurate ;ange 
studies whatsoever as yet , s~ 3 r would not want to be quoted on the above figures. 
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Just four days l ater , the Air Corps formally solicit-
ed a design study from Northrop for a Flying Wing bomber 
capable of the followi ng performance levels : 14 
Range (miles) 
Maximum Speed (mph) 
Average Speed (mph) 
Ceiling (feet) 
Minimum 
5 , 333 
400 
250 
35 , 000 
Desired 
6 , 000 
450 
300 
45 , 000 
On September 12 , 1941 , Mr . Northrop responded, offer-
ing to sell the Air Corps one Flying Wing bomber (by now 
designated the XB-35) for $2,870,000 . He said a second 
could be built for $1 ,5 50 , 000 . The first aircraft could be 
completed within twenty-four months of contract approval ; 
delivery of the second could be negotiated later. 15 
On November 1 , 1941 , a contract was formalized , with 
Northrop providing one XB- 35 bomber, plus a wooden mockup 
and flight data information , for a total price of 
16 $2,910 , 000 . But almost immediately , problems arose . 
Northrop had never built an aircraft the size of the XB- 35, 
and on December 1, 1941, the corporation notified the 
Assistant Chief of the Materiel Division that they were 
facing a serious capacity problem . While a second XB-35 
17 
could be assembled within five months of the first, space 
constraints at the Hawthorne plant were such that there 
could be no assembly line . In fact, there was not even room 
to assemble a single XB-35, unless Northrop went ahead and 
built a new structure for that purpose . Even that proposed 
building would only handle one bomber at a time : assembly of 
subsequent aircraft could not begin until the previous one 
17 
was complete . This proved to be a crucial problem : 
similar space constraints would plague Northrop throughout 
the decade, and would prove to be one of the factors which 
ultimately contributed to the Flying Wing ' s demise . 
Just six days later , though, the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor gave new impetus to the Flying Wing program . 
On December 12 , the Air Corps ordered the second XB-35 . 18 
Six months later, the wooden mockup of the XB-35 was ready 
for review by the Air Corps Experimental Engineering Sec -
tion ; because it was so revol utionary and so highly classi-
fied , British members a s sign ed to the American team were not 
allowed to take part in the inspection of the mockup . 19 
But by later in 1942, the XB- 35- -like other projects--
was tangled in a confusing web of national priorities. 
Shortages of resources--especially engineering talent- - were 
threatening to cause long delays in a number of aircraft 
programs . Attempts were made to get increased resources 
applied to the XB- 35 effort , thus freeing the XB-35 from 
thi s entanglement , but the e f forts were unsuccessful . On 
September 28 , 1942 , the Deputy Ch i ef of the Air Staff wrote 
to the Commanding General of Materiel Command, General 
Echols: 
Highest priority should be given research and de-
velopment activities for these particular projects 
[XB-35, and Convair's competitor XB-36] by the Air 
Cor~s , w~th particular reference to Northrup [sic] 
eng1neer1ng personnel . . . . An attempt should be 
make.to secure AAA pr iority from w . ~ B. [War Pro-
duct1on Board] for these airplanes . 0 
18 
The Commander of Materiel Command responded , describ-
ing the hectic wartime environment, in which the shortage of 
men and materiel contributed to the long delays that would 
prove characteristic of both the XB-35 and XB-36 programs : 
The very highest priority possible has been given to 
the Northrup [sic] XB- 35 . . . . Efforts have been 
made and are still being made . . . to borrow engin-
eers from other manufacturers on the West Coast to 
assist Mr . Northrup [sic] . To date no success has 
been had . . . . There is a definite shortage of 
engineers in the industry and in the Materiel Com-
mand . Practically all projects have extremely high 
priority . Whenever an endeavor is made to expedite 
any project , it results i~1delay of some other pro-ject of highest priority. 
By November, t hough, help was on the way . The Air 
Corps decided to cancel a contract with the Glenn Martin 
Company for design and production of 402 B-33 bombers . The 
Air Staff directed thet " the B- 33 will be abandoned immed -
iately and the engineering talent engaged thereon will be 
36 . " 22 transferred to the XB-35 and XB- proJects . 
But General Echols of Materiel Command was aware that 
the engineering shortage was only part of Northrop's 
problem . He understood all too well that even with the 
transfer of Martin ' s eng ineers to Northrop, the space con-
straints at Hawthorne still would make mass production 
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infeasible . Therefore, General Echols decided to give 
Martin the right to build the Flying Wing bombers, by con-
verting Martin's B-33 contract to YB-35s . In a note added 
to the Confidential Air Staff memo abandoning the B-33, Gen-
eral Echols wrote: 
I have issued instructions to Wright Field . . . to 
start procedure to convert B-33 contracts to B-35 . 
I have taken this matter up with Mr. Martin person-
ally and his representatives are now at the Northrop 
plant in Calif . 
23 O. P . E . 
The theme of this memo from General Echols is central 
to the whole Flying Wing story: because Northrop did not 
have the capacity for quantity assembly, the Air Corps had 
to turn elsewhere for the actual production runs . In this 
case, the beneficiary was the Glenn Martin Company. Six 
years later, the situation would arise again , with Convair 
taking on production of the XB-35's successor, the jet-pow-
ered RB-49 . In both cases, the underlying cause was the 
same: Northrop was simply incapable of producing the Flying 
Wing bombers in the quantities required. 
Five days after the General Echols memo , the Air Corps 
notified Northrop that the B-35 would be built by Martin at 
24 its Baltimore plant. By December , 1942, Materiel Com-
mand had decided the specifics : Northrop could build one 
hundred B-35s at Hawthorne, while Martin built another hun-
d d l . 25 re at Ba tlmore. But even the hundred B-35s were 
too much for Northrop. On December 28, 1942, General Echols 
was informed that Northrop did not want to participate in 
any production beyond the experimental and service test 
craft : 
Northrop has been contacted and indicates that with 
their facilities as now existing, they will be un-
able to fabricate more than the XB [experimental] 
and YB [service test] type airplanes already on con-
tract, ~nd ~sked that they be relieved of th2 load 
of fabr1cat1ng these additional one hundred . 6 
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The entire order of two hundred B-35s was then shifted 
to Martin , which was able to promise an eventual delivery 
27 rate of forty aircraft per month . But the joint ven-
ture between Northrop and Martin proved ineffective . By May 
1943 , Martin halved the projected peak delivery rate to 
twenty planes per month, and acknowledged that even that 
rate could not be reached until September 1945 . 28 Other 
problems being faced by Martin were brought to the attention 
of Materiel Command . On May 18, 1943, Martin told the Com-
manding General of Materiel Command about Northrop-directed 
changes in the XB-35 ' s aluminum skin: "We wish to bring out 
this information in order that you may fully realize the 
unknowns that we are facing in the manufacture of this air-
plane ." 29 More months of b ickering between Martin and 
Northrop followed, until in August 1943 Martin notified Air 
Materiel Command that it wanted to be released from the B-35 
project: 
Due to the uncertainties surrounding this project 
and due to the existing doubts as to whether the 
airplane is now ready for production, it seems im-
pr~per.to incur ~Brther production expenditures at 
th1s t1me . . . . 
In the meantime , a one-third scale model Flying Wing- -
called the N- 9M--was undergoing wind tunnel and flight test-
ing , and the disappointing r esults had reached Washington . 
21 
Chief of Army Air Forces General H. H. " Hap " Arnold wired the 
Commanding General of Materiel Command on Nove mber 24, 1943 : 
Latest information indicates that the XB- 35 range 
has dropped off 1600 miles, and high spe ed has drop-
ped twenty-four miles below previous estimates. De-
tailed . information is desired, especially insofar as 
range 1s concerned . . . . In view of this latest 
disappointment[,] request you present opinion as to 
t~e ~erits of the XB- 35 and the desirability of Ion-
tlnUlng the present extensive production plans . 3 
By early 1944 , the e ntire XB-35 program was in serious 
trouble . Northrop couldn ' t produce the aircraft in quan-
tity , the Martin Company was unhappy in its role as producer 
of another firm ' s design, and the entire project was far be-
hind schedule . The XB- 35 was still years away from its 
first flight, and now data based on its flying scale model 
N-9M showed that performance would be far below expecta-
tions . In August of 1941 , the Materiel Command had nearly 
doubled the required range of the XB-35 to ten thousand 
miles . But in January 1944 , a Materiel Command memo esti -
mated the XB- 35 ' s range with a ten-thousand-pound bomb load 
at only 5200 miles . While this was a significant improve-
ment over the then-operational B- 29 , it fell far short of 
• 1 • t 32 the Army A1r Force s requ1remen s . 
There were still other problems . One of the N-9M fly -
ing scale models had crashed in May 1943, killing the pilot , 
and subsequent investigation pointed toward dangerous and 
33 
mysterious handling characteristics at low speeds . 
Then the Martin Company--brought in to bring engineering 
help to the project--i tsel f became short of engineers , and 
had to borrow 350 draftsmen fr om the Otis Elevator Company . 
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Martin estimated that this would delay the first B-35 
delivery until at least 1947. 34 Soon thereafter, Martin 
lost even more engineers to the Selective Service draft. 
Finally, in an undated, handwritten memo, General Echols, by 
that time Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, officially 
killed the production aspect of the program with which he 
had struggled for so long : 
Prepare a memo to Chief of Air Staff recommending 
that due to the additional delay . . 3~e cancel the production contract with Martin .. .. 
In 1941, Northrop had said that the first XB-35 could 
be delivered in November of 1943, i . e . , twenty-four months 
after the contract was signed. 36 But by May 1944, the 
best estimate for the XB-35's maiden flight was August 
37 1945, and Martin couldn't deliver the first production 
B-35s until 1947. 38 While much of the problem was be-
yond the control of either Northrop or Martin, the combina-
tion of long delays and changing wartime requirements led 
the Air Staff to agree that at least the production contract 
for two hundred B-35s should be terminated . On June 3 , 
1944, a terse letter from a low-ranking contracting officer 
to the Martin Company made it official : 
The Government no longer requires the articles 
called for under subject contract ~nd haj 9therefore terminated the same for its conven1ence . 
Northrop was permitted to continue work on the two ex-
perimental (XB) and thirteen added service test (YB) models , 
but all plans for large scale production were scrapped. 
Those fifteen XB and YB models, though, would form the core 
23 
of the post-war Flying Wing bomber program, and would lead 
to perhaps the ultimate Flying Wing : the eight-jet YB-49 . 
Summary 
In essence, the Flying Wing bomber programs can be 
classed in two eras . The first, running through all of 
World War II , was characterized by the development of the 
propeller-driven XB-35 . The second era began with the first 
XB-35 flight, and would continue through the test program of 
the jet-powered YB-49 and YRB-49. 
We will see that both programs were unsuccessful, and 
for remarkably similar reasons . First, aircraft stability--
in serious doubt after the 1943 crash of the N-9M--proved to 
be an equally significant problem in the post-war program . 
Second , Northrop •s lack of plant capacity- -the cause of the 
whole Martin Company involvement--proved equally crippling 
during the the YB-49/YRB-49 development . Finally , aircraft 
performance , especial ly range, was disappointing in the 
XB-35, and would be far more troubling with the YB-49 . 
These factors , all part of the cancellation of the B-35s, 
would play equally critical roles in the 1949 cancellation 
of the RB-49 . 
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CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS 
THE XB-35 IN THE POST-WAR YEARS 
Although the Army Air Force cancelled quantity pro-
duction of the B-35s , work continued at Northrop on the 
limited number of experimental (XB} and service test (YB} 
airplanes. Finally , on June 25 , 1946, the first XB - 35 took 
to the air--near l y three years behind schedule1 and at a 
cost nearly five times the original estimate . 2 
Flight Test 
The f i rst flight--from Northrop Field to Muroc - -was 
uneventful, and largely trouble-free. 3 But that was to 
be the first and l as t trouble-free flight for the XB- 35. 
For the rest of their existence, the XB- and YB- 35s would be 
hampered by a seemingly endless succession of problems , most 
of which , i ronically , were not directly associated with the 
Flying Wi ng configuration itself . 
The most critical and persistent problems with the 
XB- 35 were related to the gearbox and propeller systems . 
Each of the four Pratt and Whitney R-4360 engines drove two 
sets of four propeller blades , each set rotating in a dif-
ferent direct i on . Northrop test pilot Max Stanley summed up 
the troubles in a 1980 speech: 
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It was plagued with problems from the very beginning 
of the program .. . propellers which would fail to 
govern, or would not feather, and if they did feather, 
they would not unfeather . The driveshaft would de-
velop unacceptable vibration . The gearbox would 
overheat. Each of these malfunctions resulte~ in 
program delays, some of which were extensive . 
The XB-35's problems were at least as serious as Stanley's 
speech indicated, and perhaps more so. One of the first 
test flights ended with both engines on the same side shut 
down because of propeller failure, and for a time the XB-35 
was grounded while a solution was sought . 5 
But that solution proved elusive . Pratt and Whitney, 
the engine manufacturers, blamed the propeller fabricators, 
Hamilton Standard , for oil leaks and materiel failures. 
Hamilton Standard , in turn , blamed Pratt and Whitney as 
well as Northrop, claiming that both firms had been warned 
that problems would be almost unavoidable in the giant 8-
bladed props . 6 Hamilton Standard and Pratt and Whitney 
were sister companies : since the mid-1930s , both had been 
0 7 t subsidiaries of the United Aircraft Corporatlon. Bu 
their close relationship apparently did not make it any 
easier for them to solve the XB-35 ' s propulsion problems. 
Because of the unusual amount of stress involved, Air 
Materiel Command determined that the maximum life of the 
propellers was only eighty hours , so that--assuming an 
average operational flight of eight hours-- all the 
propellers would have to be scrapped after every tenth 
flight . 8 This was obviously unacceptable, as were the 
continuing propeller failures : the ninth test flight of the 
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XB-35 suffered another gearbox failure, and the tenth flight 
ended with the XB-35 limping home on two engines, again due 
to prop failure . 9 
Search for Solutions 
It was becoming clear that the propeller fiasco was 
causing a critical bottleneck in the entire B- 35 program . 
The second XB-35 was near l y complete , and the remaining 
service test YB-35s were in work as well , but the propulsion 
problems threatened to keep the entire fleet grounded indef-
initely . In February 1947, a meeting was held at Wright 
Field to try to solve the problem : 
Due to engineering difficulties and materiel fail -
ures encountered in dual rotation gearbox and pro-
peller installations in XB-35 airplanes, investiga-
tion has been conducted to determine the most feas -
ible method of obtaining flyable B-35 airplanes at 
an early date . . . . It was determined that single 
rotation gearbox . . . would enable the first XB-35 
to fly [again] at the earliest possible date .. . 
Hamilton Standard personnel were 1~ery pessimistic about the dual rotat i on program . 
Following this meeting , some of the dual rotation bugs 
were ironed out , and both XB- 35s--for a time--kept their 
counter-rotating props . But further purchases of all such 
equipment were cancelled , and the remaining service-test 
YB-35s were scheduled to be fitted with single rotation 
11 propeller systems . By early 1948, even the two XB-35s 
had been retrofitted to the single-rotation configura-
t . 12 1.on . 
But the simpler single- rotation propellers also proved 
unsatisfactory . Max imum speed--one of the Flying Wing's 
unique strengths--was reduced, 13 dealing yet another 
blow to the B-35 program . Northrop pilot Max Stanley ex-
pected the simple props to be ineffective, and was proven 
correct. As he recalled in 1980: 
Finally, almost in desperation, the dual rotating 
propellers were removed and replaced with a single 
four-~lade propeller . As expected, these propellers 
were 1ncapable of absorbing and delivering the full 
power of the engines resulti~g in an unacceptable 
degradation in performance . 
Air Force test pilots agreed . In March, 1948, when 
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John Northrop suggested that a publicity program be set up 
to break current world records with his Flying Wing bombers, 
the Air Force declined . The then-current record holders--
primarily the P-80 fighter (for speed) and B-29 bomber (for 
distance)--had been well-tested before their record-breaking 
attempts, the Air Force reasoned. But pilot reports on the 
XB-35--even with the new propeller arrangement--had been 
extremely negative, pointing out that the new configuration 
had resulted in lower performance and higher levels of vib-
ration , both on the ground and in flight . As a result, Air 
Materiel Command recommended that both the XB-35 and its 
jet-powered successor , the YB-49, be subjected to further 
testing before any record-breaking attempts were made. 15 
The endless B-35 problems were fast causing Air Force 
interest to wane. At a conference on August 16, 1948, 
Materiel Command and Northrop representatives met to dis-
cuss what to do with the eleven YB-35s, none of which had 
yet flown . The group came up with four alternatives , two 
involving storing the B-35s unti l better engines came along 
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(at a minimum additional cost of 2.5 million dollars) ; the 
other two choices called for immediate conversion of YB-35s 
to jet-powered B-49s (at an additional cost of 2.923 million 
dollars) . 16 
But just three days later, an Air Staff letter to Air 
Materiel Command killed all four of the above options . 
Northrop was to be notified that no more money would be 
allocated to produce B- 35s ; Northrop was to take the avail -
able funds and use them to deliver a maximum number of 
YB-35s to the Air Force ' s Strategic Air Command for opera-
. 1 . 17 t1ona test1ng . But a week later, on August 27, 1948, 
Air Materiel Command replied that there were not enough 
funds to turn over even a single YB-35 to SAC, because of 
unsatisfactory propulsion and exhaust systems . There were 
enough funds for preliminary flight tests of one YB-35 , but 
18 the others would need to be either scrapped or stored . 
The demise of the XB/YB-35 program meant that 
Northrop ' s hopes for a successful Flying Wing bomber would 
have to rest on a variant of the B-35 , the jet-powered 
YB-49s . Those aircraft, only two of which would ever be 
built, would now represent the future of the Flying Wing 
bomber . 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE YB-49: THE FLYING WING BOMBER 
IN THE JET AGE 
Toward the end of World War II, the aviation world 
began to experiment with jet propulsion. The Germans intro-
duced the twin-jet ME-262 fighter to the skies of Europe 
with considerable effectiveness, 1 while American efforts 
focused on the less successful P-59 jet fighter . 2 By 
1945 it appeared that the future of jet propulsion was 
assured . 
Against this backdrop, the Army Air Force and Northrop 
agreed in June 1945 to experiment with a jet-powered Flying 
Wing bomber . To minimize the development time required, it 
was determined that two of the original thirteen YB-35 ser-
vice airplanes already on contract would be modified to jet 
propulsion . The new airplanes would be called YB-49s. 3 
The YB-49s were almost identical to the YB-35s in all 
but the propulsion system. The four R-4360 engines with 
propellers that had caused so many problems for the XB-35 
were to be replaced by eight TG-180 jet engines, each with 
just 3750 pounds of thrust . 4 Substantial vertical fins 
were added for stability, replacing the engine housings and 
propeller shafts, and two of the eight bomb bays were con-
verted to fuel tanks to feed the thirsty jet engines . 5 
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The YB-49 program acquired new significance when it 
became apparent that the B-35 propeller problems might never 
be fully solved . In May of 1946, Air Materiel Command saw 
the YB- 49 as a potential savior for the entire Flying Wing 
program : 
In view of the high propeller blade stresses and the 
elastic gearbox mounting difficulties presently be-
ing encountered on the XB-35 airplane, it appears 
that the YB-49 might offer a desirable alternate 
power plant installation in the e vent a satisfac5ory 
solution to the above problem cannot be reached . 
The AMC memo went on to describe the other principal 
benefit of the YB-49: speed . Its projected top speed was to 
be 465 miles per hour , versus 391 miles per hour for the 
XB-35. The differential in cruising speed would be even 
greater : 400 miles per hour for the YB-49, against only 240 
miles per hour for the XB-35. But all this performance was 
not without its price: range with a 20 , 000 bomb load was ex-
pected to drop from 4175 miles to about 3500 . 7 
Despite the generally encouraging figures , all real-
ized that the YB-49 was not an optimal design . By the time 
the YB-49 was completed in October 1947, the authoritative 
magazine Aviation Week noted the fact that while its fuel 
consumption was four times that of the XB-35, the extra bomb 
bay fuel tanks meant that range had been cut "only a little 
more than half . " 8 While the short range was of concern , 
it was attributed to the fact that the YB-49 was a jet-age 
modification of a propeller-era airframe. A Northrop en-
gineer wrote : 
The YB-49 airplane was originally conceived as a 
purely experimental jet- powered version of the 
XB-~5 . The existing XB- 35 structure was to be 
rev1sed . ... only as necessary to allow the in-
stallatlon of ~he TG- 180 engines and required extra 
fuel capacity . 
And the Air Materiel Command agreed : 
Although the YB - 49 has obvious limitations, primarily 
d~e to the fact that it is a modification , it is con-
Sldered that the ~irpl~5e will be extremely valuable 
as a research proJect . 
Shortcomings as a Bomber 
Its characteristics may have made it a satisfactory 
research project , but it appeared that the YB-49 would be 
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totally inadequate as a bomber . It had only six bomb bays : 
bays #1 and #8 on the XB-35 were converted to fuel tanks on 
the YB-49 . Like the XB-35, the largest bomb which could be 
carried was 4000 pounds ; larger standard Air Force bombs of 
12,000 and 22 , 000 pounds could not fit at a11 . 11 In -
credibly , the YB-49 , l ike the XB-35 , could not even carry 
the atomic bomb . 12 These shortcomings were well-recog-
nized as early as 1946, and elements in the Air Staff were 
skeptical even then that the YB-49 would ever develop into 
an adequate bomber : 
If procurement were initiated for the B- 49 , it 
would not reach tactical units before other bombers 
of the same class having equal performance and with 
provisions for carrying the A-bomb . Therefore it is 
felt that unless the B- 49 can be modified to carry13 the atom bomb , further procurement is unwarranted . 
F light Tests 
Despite these reservations, work continued on the 
two YB-49s, and the first was successfu lly flown from 
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Hawthorne to Muroc on October 21, 1947. 14 The first 
flight was uneventful, according to the test pilot Max 
Stanley, who stated in 1980 that the YB-49 program was far 
less troublefilled than that of the XB-35 : 
The YB-49 flight test program was as trouble-free 
as the XB-35 was troublesome . All test objectives 
were met on or ahead of schedule . The airplane 
proved to be sim~~e to fly with no special pilot 
skills required. 
But other records paint a much different picture . The 
first flight did go according to plan. 16 But on the 
YB-49's second flight, the nose gear door blew off, and the 
nose landing gear would not lower . Through a hastily-
convened radio conference , Northrop engineers were able to 
17 
work with the pilot to get the landing gear down. 
Other problems existed as well: for example, constant- speed-
drive generators, designed to provide electrical power for 
the YB-49, were deleted by government order, and replaced by 
auxiliary power units. These units, called APUs, failed 
frequently , first during tests and later in flight, and 
filled up three of the six bomb bays as well. 18 
Despite these and other problems, the YB-49 test pro-
gram did seem generally more successful than that of the 
XB-35 . Northrop and the Air Force traded pats on the back, 
congratu l ating each other for having had the wisdom and 
fortitude to see the Flying Wing bomber program through the 
difficult XB-35 days . On December 19, 1947, Northrop wrote 
to Gen . carl A. Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff: 
You are well acquainted with the continuing pr~blems 
concerning reduction gear and propeller operat~on 
t~at have kept the B- 35s virtually grounded for 
e1ghteen months since the first one was flown to 
Muroc. Fortunately we have had better luck with 
the first jet-powered YB-49, and have been able to 
get almost as much time in two months with jets as 
was secured in eighteen months on the two XB-35s. 
As chief of the USAF, I am sure you will be 
happy to know that our best expectations concerning 
performance are being fulfilled . . . . In other 
words, the project has already been proven highly 
successful . . . . You can definitely uncross your 
fin~ers I~ncerning the value and success of the 
proJect. 
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General Spaatz' comments on January 8 , 19 48, were less en-
thusiastic and more reserved than Mr . Northrop's . General 
Spaatz closed by saying : 
All of us have been keenly disappointed over the 
failure to obtain adequate flight data from the 
XB-35s . We realize that your company is not at fault 
in this failure. The conclusive data which can be 
obtained by continued, intensive flig~ 0 tests with the YB-49 is [sic] anxiously awaited . 
Materiel Command Reservations 
If General Spaatz appeared to be hedging a bit on the 
Flying Wing bomber concept , he had very good reason. An in-
ternal Air Materiel Command memo , dated the day before Gen-
eral Spaatz ' response , reflected the serious concern AMC had 
regarding the in-flight stability of the YB-49: 
This section does not believe that adequate infor-
mation or analysis has been made to thoroughly. 
evaluate the probabil i ty of success of the Fly1ng 
Wing . . . the two unknowns which must be thorough-
ly evaluated before undertaking another wing air-
plane are as follows : 
a. Inherent stability or artificially induced 
automatic pilot stability at cruising speeds 
(affecting the stable bombing platform) . 
b. High speed stability . . . . This second.prob-
lem cannot be minimized because an a11-w1ng 
airplane .. . will have all the problems 
a~sociated with swept wings without the bene-
flt of long tail lengths to assist in the 
solution of those problems . 21 
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Even Max Stanley agreed that stability was indeed a problem : 
A more serious shortcoming was revealed by flight 
tests which indicated that the YB-49 had very low 
~aw damping with oscillations extending over a per-
lod of as long as 10-12 seconds . This was a serious 
deficiency in the stability of the airplane and cast 
a dark shadow on thz 2suitability of the aircraft as a bombing pla t form . 
So at this point the Air Force had a bomber with in-
adequate range , and which was incapable of carrying t he 
atomic bomb--or even large conventional bombs , for that 
matter . In addition , the airplane tended to be unstable in 
flight , and yawed so much from side to side that accurate 
bombing results were thought to be unlikely . Still , despite 
all the Air Force •s qualms, Northrop continued to lead the 
cheers for the Flying Wing bombers : 
Flight tests compiled to date on XB-35 and YB-49 
airplanes have fully conf irmed expected high per-
formance of those airplanes, as well as the fact 
that they have features of stability and contro l-
ability renderin~3 them entirely satisfactory for bombing missions. 
Tests of Range 
For a time in the early part of 1948 , the YB-49 •s 
future began to brighten . The second YB-49 made its maiden 
flight on January 13, and soon joined its partner in flight 
tests at Muroc . 24 Distance tests in April led to are-
cord- setting flight , in which a YB-49 stayed aloft for more 
than nine hours , covering more than three thousand miles en-
route from Muroc to San Francisco to Phoenix and back to 
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Muroc. While this was a record endurance for jet aircraft, 
and while it was accomplished with one engine shut down for 
part of the flight, it was only about one-third of the ori-
ginal ten thousand mile specification laid out for the 
Flying Wing bomber in 1942 . 25 Still, the results were 
encouraging enough that the new Air Force Chief of Staff , 
Gen . Hoyt S . Vandenberg , wrote to Mr. Northrop on May 12, 
congratulating him on t he successful test flights . 26 
Disaster 
On June 5 , 1948 , Maj . Daniel Forbes and Capt. Glen 
Edwards, along with three other crewmembers, were scheduled 
to take up the second YB- 49 for what should have been a 
routine test flight . In the nearly five months since its 
maiden flight, the second YB-49 had flown twenty-seven 
times, for a total of about sixty-six hours in the air . The 
first twenty-four flights had been under the control of 
Northrop , but on June 4 , the YB-49 was transferred to the 
Air Force. Three fl ights on the day of transfer totalled 
nearly eleven hours, and the fourth Air Force flight was 
27 
scheduled for the next day, June 5th . 
The YB-49 took off from Muroc at 5:44A . M. , and 
reported twenty- six minutes later, over Bakersfield , 
California . At 6 : 33A . M., the crew, by then over the north 
end of the Antelope Valley , reported decending through 
fifteen thousand feet . That was last ever heard from the 
YB-49 crew . At approximately 7 : 03A . M., the bomber was seen 
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to fall, tumbling from the sky north of Muroc . 
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Only a few people witnessed the crash, and by the time 
they saw the aircraft, it was already tumbling out of con-
trol. One eyewitness was Maj . Russ Schleeh , an Air Force 
fighter test pilot whose career would later become closely 
entwined with the remaining YB-49 : 
I was en route to the North Base from the Muroc Main 
Base by auto when something attracted my atte ntion 
on the west side of the road on which I was travel-
ing . At first it appeared to be falling pieces of 
metal. Probably it was the outer wing panels or 
control surfaces that caught my eye . I then glanced 
north and noticed the main section of the airplane 
tumbling and later contacting the ground just north 
of the Mojave-Victorville highway . I rushed to the 
scene after scanning the sky for parachutes and 
rummaged around the wreckage but could not identify 
anything of consequence due to the impact damage and 
result~9g fire and total destruction of the air-
craft . 
There were no parachutes : all five men aboard the 
YB-49 were killed. Muroc was later renamed Edwards Air 
Force Base in honor of the copilot Edwards. But like many 
events surrounding the Flying Wing program, exactly what 
happened on that June morning is a matter of dispute . Max 
Stanley, in his 1980 speech , did not even mention the crash ; 
he alluded only briefly to the YB-49 ' s " reputation as an 
airplane with unacceptable stall characteristics, " are-
putation he claimed was not deserved . 30 The official 
Northrop history implies that the crew simply exceeded the 
design limits of the airplane , perhaps descending at too 
high a speed . 31 Ed Maloney, in his not-always-unbiased 
book, Northrop Flying Wings, makes a similar suggestion: 
" It is assumed that .. . the ' not to exceed ' limits of the 
aircraft were exceeded while descending from 40 , 000 feet ." 
42 
Maloney admits, though, that this is speculation, and that 
"what exactly happened is not known . " 32 
But Air Force records, while they do not point con-
clusively to the cause, indicate that the problem wasn't a 
result of the highly experienced crew simply going too fast. 
Rather , the records point, albeit inconclusively, toward an 
accident which resulted from a stall, the same maneuver Max 
Stanley said was so safe , but a maneuver which records show 
Air Force pilots were apparently reluctant to even attempt . 
Two days after the crash, Northrop Engineering Test 
Pilot F . C . Bretcher dispatched a memo to Northrop head -
quarters in Hawthorne . Bretcher wrote that , although his 
information was not to be considered final, he had learned 
the agenda for the fatal test flight . Takeoff was to be 
followed by a climb to forty thousand feet, when " speed-
power runs ," i . e ., how much power was required to reach a 
given airspeed, were to be conducted. The crew was to 
gather data on exhaust temperatures , and then shut down and 
restart two engines . The final event was to involve one 
stall , probably at ten thousand- fifteen thousand feet . 33 
Since the last radio call from the crew was at fifteen 
thousand feet and descending, and since the crew reported no 
problems at that time , it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the disastrous loss of control probably happened during the 
stall tests. But that last radio call was at 6 : 33A .M . , and 
the crash did not occur until 7 : 03 , a half-hour later . One 
stall shouldn 't take thirty minutes; if the Bretcher memo 
was correct, what else was the crew doing in addition to 
that single stall? 
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A later Air Force document suggests the answer . Lt. 
Col . Frank J . Collins, in an official statement in the 
records of the crash probe, confirmed most of the Bretcher 
memo . However , there was not just one stall on the 
schedule , as Bretcher had thought . Rather , a whole series 
was to be accomplished , at progressively higher power 
settings : " If the airpl ane pr oved to handle clean l y during 
these stalls , stalls with higher power settings were to be 
obtained ." This clearly implies that there was a lot yet to 
learn about the stall characteristics of the YB-49. What 
did Forbes and Edwards , e xperienced Air Force test pilots, 
think of the stall tests in the YB-49? The Collins memo 
continues : " It is known that the pilot was reluctant to 
attempt the higher power stalls ." 34 
So , the June 5 c r a sh probably occurred while the crew 
was attempting a ser ies of sta l ls , each one at higher power 
settings than the l ast . Further , the stalls were t hought to 
be dangerous enough that a n experienced Air Force test p i-
lot , a man not unaccustomed to risk , was reluctant to per-
form them. The comments of Northrop pilot Stanley--that the 
stall characteristics of the YB- 49 were acceptable- -seem to 
be contradicted by these documents , and by the tumbling air-
plane that fell out of the sky on a sunny June morning in 
1948 . 
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Aftermath 
Surprisingly, the crash did not kill the YB-49 
program. The surviving YB-49 was grounded for inspection 
and some modification, but was later reentered into the 
flight test program . In the meantime, Convair's giant B- 36 
bomber had run into problems, and the Air Force had decided 
to stop production at the ninety-fifth aircraft. But the 
B-36 plant at Fort Worth was twice the size of the Northrop 
plant and it was government-owned . The Commanding General 
of the Air Materiel Command decided that it was necessary to 
keep the Fort Worth plant operating, and if the B-36 could 
not be continued, another bomber would have to be substi-
tuted. AMC decided to try to convince the Air Staff to 
build the B-49 in quantity. On June 17, 1948--just twelve 
days after the fatal crash--Gen. Joseph T. McNarney wrote to 
the Air Force Chief of Staff recommending purchase of fif -
teen B-49s per month, most of which would be built at Fort 
Worth, by Convair through a subcontract arrangement with 
Northrop. 
This was a most extraordinary letter. No mention was 
made of the crash, nor was there any indication that the 
Strategic Air Command, the ultimate user of the bomber, 
supported the request. General McNarney based his recom-
mendation solely on the need to keep the Fort Worth plant 
open, and suggested that the money for the B-49s come from 
cancellation of thirty North American B-45 bombers per 
month. 35 
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The Air Staff was not convinced. While they agreed 
that cancellation of North American's B-45 was a good idea, 
they strongly disagreed wi th the notion of building more 
B-49s , at Fort Worth or anywhere else. In addition to the 
fact that the recent crash indicated that the YB-49 obvious-
ly required more testing, the Air Staff pointed out that its 
short range classed the YB- 49 as a medium bomber, and the 
Air Force already had enough medium bombers . General 
McNarney ' s recommendation was turned down . 36 
More Flight Test Problems 
The Air Staff decision was later validated by further 
tests . In addition to all the previous shortcomings of the 
YB- 49 as a bomber , tests in November 1948 showed that the 
YB-49 was incapable of even performing a satisfactory bomb 
run. The test pilot, then-Major Robert Cardenas, was quoted 
as stating the plane was "extremely unstable and very diffi-
cult to fly on a bombing mission . .. continual yawing 
made it impossible to hold a steady course or a con-
stant airspeed and altitude . " Bomb runs took four times as 
long as similar runs with a B-29, and accuracy was only half 
as good . Air Materiel Command recommended that the YB-49 
stay at Muroc until aerodynamic problems were fixed , and 
that until that time , the YB-49 was believed to be unsuit-
. k 37 
able for either bomber or reconna~ssance wor . 
November 16, 1948, marked the effective end of the 
YB-49 program . On that date, Brig . Gen . K. P . McNaughton, 
Acting Di rector of Training and Requirements , wrote to 
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Gen . Muir S . Fairchild, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff . In 
the memo General McNaughton stated that there was no longer 
any requirement for the B- 49 bomber . It was already infer-
ior to Boeing's new B- 47, which had topped six hundred miles 
per hour in testing, and would soon be competing against the 
B-52, expected to be even better than the B-47 . General 
McNaughton recommended tha t the B-49 be droppect . 38 
By February 1949 , the decision had been made . The 
surviving YB-49 wou ld cont i nue flight testing . Another 
YB-35 would be modified to a reconnaissance version, and 
three more YB-35s would be turned into flying test beds for 
various purposes . All other Wings would be scrapped, saving 
the Air Force approximately $7,500 , 000 , when compared to the 
cost of completing production on all the aircraft in pro-
gress.39 On October 28 , 1 949 , the Air Force finally 
cancelled most of the remaining program : only the YB- 49, 
permitted to continue f light test , and the YRB-49 , the 
reconnaissance conversion , t h a t had not yet flown , sur-
. d 40 VlVe • 
Epilog 
The second YB- 49 continued in the flight test program . 
In April , 1949 , a new chief Air Force test pilot was brought 
in. The man chosen had previously served as Chief of Fight-
er Flight Test at Wright Field : Maj . Russ Schleeh, the same 
Russ Schleeh who had been an eyewitness to the Forbes/ 
41 Edwards crash nine mon ths before . 
on March 15 , 195 0, t he r ema i ning YB- 49 was destroy e d 
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in a taxi accident . Once again , the cause of the crash was 
a matter of disagreement . The Northrop history blamed the 
Air Force pilot, claiming that Major Schleeh had tried to 
turn the nose wheel at too high a speed : 
. . . this same airplane was destroyed one year 
later (March 15, 1950) during an excessively high-
speed turn while taxiing on the runway at Edwards 
Air Force Base. The nose gear collapsed, flipping 
the airplane cow~letely over. All of the crew es-
caped unharmed. 
But once again , the Air Force perspective was differ-
ent . According to the military records, the real cause was 
a failed or unserviced "shimmy damper," a device which con-
trols the tendency of a nose gear to wobble . This interpre-
tation is backed up by crash photos, which show a long 
sinuous streak of rubber , with the oscillations becoming 
worse just before the gear finally collapsed. From the 
Edwards Air Force Base history : 
A stability test to determine the nose gear lift-
off speed at forward cg [center of gravity] was be-
ing conducted on the dry lake bed when a violent 
nose gear shimmy was encountered near lif t-off speed . 
The vibration became so severe as to cause failure of 
the nose gear strut . The fuel leaks and subsequent 
fire . .. resulted in destruction of the aircraft . 
All personnel were able to leave the airplane, al -
though the pilot, Major R. E . Schleeh, and engineer , 
C~ptain M . . F~ench , 4~oth of the AMC Flight Test Divi -Slon were ln)ured. 
Thus the destruction of the sole surviving YB-49 ended 
the story of the Flying Wing bombers. Only one aircraft re-
mained--a reconnaissance model called the YRB-49--and it had 
not yet flown when the second YB-49 crashed at Edwards . But 
it would f ly two months later , and it would come to repre-
sent still another strange aspect of the Flying Wing story . 
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CHAPTER V 
THE RECONNAISSANCE VERSION OF THE FLYING WING : 
THE YRB-49 
So far , our review of the Flying Wing bombers has 
shown that only fifteen airframes were ever ordered from 
Northrop, and that the orders for those fifteen were all 
placed by 1942 . We have seen that for a number of reasons , 
including range , stability, and bomb carrying capacity , 
serious doubts existed within the Air Force as to the suit-
ability of the XB-35 and YB-49 Flying Wing bombers . 
But we have also seen Mr. Northrop ' s claim that the 
Air Force placed another order for thirty-five aircraft in 
1948 . This order , if it existed as Mr . Northrop claimed , 
would be significant , since it would suggest that the Air 
Force ' s reservations about the Flying Wing bombers had at 
last been overcome . Mr . Northrop described the order 
clearly in his 1979 interview: 
General McNarney, who was ~he Chief of.the.Air 
Force, walked into my off1ce one morn1ng 1n 
late June of 1948 and said, "You have won the 
competition . Here is an order for thirty-five 
additional aircraft " and I took a deep breath 
and said , " Oh, that's wonderful" and he said, 
"That ' s only a drop in the bucket . We probably 
will need between tw~ hundred and three hundred 
of these airplanes ." 
Northrop test pilot Max Stanley confirmed that a 1948 
production contract for Flying Wing bombers was given to 
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Northrop: 
The Air Force furnished a bombardier who arrived at 
Muroc with the then highly secret Norden bomb sight. 
After evaluating the results of a lengthy series of 
bomb drops under varying conditions, the aircraft 
was accepted by the Air Force as a satisfactory 
bombing platform, and a production contract was 
awarded Northrop by the A~r Force . It was, however, 
a controversial decision. 
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Despite the fact that both Mr. Northrop and his chief 
test pilot agreed that a production contract for Flying Wing 
bombers was awarded in 1948, Air Force records show no such 
order. In fact, Air Force documents show clearly that no 
Flying Wing bombers were ordered from Northrop after the 
fifteen experimental and service test airplanes were ordered 
in 1941 and 1942 . What, then, is responsible for this dis-
crepancy? Were the memories of Mr. Northrop and Max Stanley 
faulty? Or are the surviving Air Force records inaccurate 
or incomplete? 
The answer is really neither . There was an order 
placed in 1948 . The number of aircraft ordered was not 
thirty-five, as Mr . Northrop recalled , but thirty , and the 
planes were not to be bombers: the Air Force was at that 
time apparently still convinced that the Flying Wings were 
not going to prove satisfactory as bombers . Instead, the 
Air Force reasoned that if the YB-49 was too unstable and 
unusable as a bomber, perhaps it could be adapted to 
another role . This line of reasoning dovetailed well with 
the Air Force's search for a long-range reconnaissance air-
craft , and it was those , not bombers , that the Air Force 
finally ordered in 1948 . The airplane came to be called the 
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YRB-49 ("YRB" indicating that it was to be a test version of 
a reconnaissance modification of a bomber design) and it 
developed into another unusual chapter in the story of the 
Flying Wing's development . 
The Need for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft 
In a letter dated Mar ch 12 , 1946, Gen . Carl A. Spaatz , 
Commanding General of the Army Air Forces , outlined the mis -
sion of a newly established combat force: 
The Strategic Air Command will be prepared to con-
duct long range offensive operations in any part 
of the world, either independently or in coopera-
~ion with land and.naval forces ; to conduct max- 4 1mum range reconna1ssance over land or sea . . . 
But SAC ' s ability to carry out "maximum range recon-
naissance over land or sea" was pretty doubtful in the late 
1940s . By 1948, SAC ' s entire reconnaissance force consisted 
of just fifty-eight aircraft, nearly all of which were rel-
atively short-range RB-17s or somewhat more capable RB - 29s. 
Both of these aircraft were designed prior to World War II; 
neither possessed the capab i lities that SAC needed . 5 
On April 12 , 1948 , a meeting was convened at Wright 
Field , the purpose of which was to determine which of three 
aircraft was best capable of meeting the reconnaissance re-
quirements of the Strategic Air Command . At that meeting , 
Considerable discussion followed as to which air -
craft , the F- 12, FDC - 6 , or FB [later RB]-49 could 
best meet the overall technical requirements . In 
addition , consideration was given to the respective 
manufacturer's capability and contemplated work-
load . . . It was agree d that the FB [RB] - 49 showed 
the greatest possibilities for development and in 
its interim stages c ou ld most realistically 
accom~lish a p~rt~on gf the overall strategic re-
connalssance m1ss1on . 
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The conferees went on to recommend that the FB/RB-49 be 
procured in three stages , based on Northrop ' s projected im-
provements . The first group of aircraft would be powered by 
eight relatively primitive jet engines; while it could be 
available by January of 1950, it would have only about half 
of the desired ten-thousand-mile range . The second batch of 
airplanes would have only six jet engines , but they would be 
more powerful than those in the previous model . Range would 
improve to 5,640 miles, but the delivery would have to wait 
until December of 1950. Waiting still one more year, until 
late 1951 , would allow the development of the third and 
ultimate version of the RB-49 . This would use two jets and 
two gas turbine power plants, which would theoretically 
combine to achieve a range of 9,320 miles . 7 
This proposed three-stage purchase of the RB- 49 was 
not an optimal solution . The Air Force felt that the range 
of the first version was insufficient, but apparently 
believed that the improvements projected for versions two 
and three would raise performance up to acceptable levels: 
Although the range of the first version of the 
[R]B- 49 was realized to be inadequate, subsequent 
versions of the aircraft , equipped with different 
engines, were expected to show considerable im-
provement . All in all , the [R]B-49 appeared at 
the time to be the most promising of the different 
airplanes available for strategic reconnaissance 
purposes . 8 
on May 3, 1948 , the Air Force notified Northrop of the 
9 . 9 decision to buy thirty of the RB- 4 s, vers1on one : 
Contractor is advised that the AMC [Air Materiel 
Command] anticipates procuring thirty FB[RB]-49 
airplanes incorporating eight J-47A engines . . . 
Min imum delivery schedule as follows : 
1949 December 1 
1950 January 1 
February 2 
March 2 
April 3 
May 3 
June 3 
July 3 
August 3 
September 3 
October 3 
November 3 
But the Air Force let Northrop know that a three 
aircraft/month schedule was not considered satisfactory : 
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Above schedule has been quoted as contractor ' s best 
schedule, however USAF considers ear lier availability 
of FB[RB]-49A production airplanes manda tory . There -
fore contractor is requested to determine how TBch 
t ime could be gained by all-out overtime . . 
The Air Force, though , didn ' t have a clear picture of 
the problem. The slow delivery schedule was due less to the 
shortage of labor than to the same plant capacity problem 
that had plagued Northrop for the entire decade . By late 
1948 , Northrop still had only about 1 . 2 mill ion square feet 
of plant space, only about 20 percent of Convair's 5 . 8 
million square feet . 11 Thus the three deliveries per 
month rate was about all that the Hawthorne plant could 
support . 
Impetus of Berlin 
In the spring of 1948 , the Air Force apparently felt it 
could live with the three planes-a-month schedule. By the 
summer , though, things had changed . After months of 
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increasing tension, the Soviets blockaded the city of Berlin 
on June 24 . The questionable combat readiness of the 
Strategic Air Command received new attention as President 
Truman ordered deployment to Europe of ninety SAC bombers 
and additional reconnaissance aircraft. 12 
Renewed emphasis on SAC meant renewed emphasis on the 
reconnaissance procurement effort . Suddenly, more aircraft 
were thought to be needed , many more than Northrop could 
deliver . The industry magazine Aviation Week commented on 
the Air Force ' s increased needs, and on Northrop ' s inability 
to satisfy them : 
Northrop's productive capacity of only three 
bombers per month at its Hawthorne, California 
facilities cannot meet the accelefjtion of the 
program desired by the Air Force. 
A week before the mounting tensions in Germany cul-
minated in the Berlin Blockade , General McNarney, Commander 
of Air Materiel Command , had recommended to the Air Staff an 
accelerated rate of fifteen RB-49 aircraft per month. Since 
Northrop could only produce 20 percent of those, General 
McNarney recommended that the remainder be built at the 
government-owned , Convair- operated plant at Fort Worth, 
which was then turning out the B-36 intercontinental bomber . 
This arrangement would provide a dual benefit: first, the 
increased production could be used by SAC to more quickly 
upgrade its strategic reconnaissance force . Second, the 
scheme would allow the Fort Worth plant to keep operating 
after the ninety- fifth (and expected to be last) B-36 was 
completed . 14 
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The Air Staff, feeling that the Flying Wing was still 
unproven, disagreed with General McNarney's proposed boost 
in production, but did (with the apparent approval of 
Secretary of the Air Force Symington) authorize the transfer 
of RB-49 production to the soon-to-be-idle Fort Worth 
factory . In a letter to General McNarney, Gen . Hoyt s. 
Vandenberg , Air Force Chief of Staff , clearly indicated his 
concern about the continuation of Fort Worth production , and 
al l uded to a possible increase in RB-49 procurement: 
. you are authorized to arrange for the transfer 
of FB [RB]-49 production from the Northrop plant to 
the Fort Worth plant in order to continue production 
upon expiration of the B-36 contract and to provide 
for adequate production facilities fgr current and 
future production of the FB[RB]-49. 
On June 30, 1948, General McNarney notif ied both 
Convair and Northrop of the decision : 
It is the desire of the Air Force to retain the 
production facilities at Fort Worth which is now 
employed in the construction of B-36 airplanes . 
Since it is not intended to buy more than the 
ninety- five B-36 airplanes presently on contract, 
it is desired that the production of RB-49s be 
moved to that facility at the earl i est possible 
date. An absolute minimum number of RB-49s will 
be built at the present Northrop facility at 
Hawthorne . . . It is requested that representa-
tives of Northrop Aircraft and Consolidated Vultee 
Aircraft arrange t~e necessary plans.for carryi~g 
out this program w1th the least poss1ble delay . 
General McNarney's letter was perhaps a classic in 
bureaucratic miscommunication . In this single communique, 
he completely recast an $84,000 , 000 contract, and told two 
competitors to simply work out the details between them-
selves ... quickly . But the "details " were staggering : 
did the General mean that Northrop should take over t he Fort 
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Worth plant? Or did he mean that Northrop should just turn 
over its designs , its tools, and its expected profits to 
Conso l idated Vultee? Just who was to be in charge in the 
Fort Worth plant? Exactly how were the profits of the joint 
venture to be allocated? 
The record shows that the McNarney letter was as am-
biguous to Northrop and Convair as it appears in retrospect 
thirty- five years later . On July 9, 1948, John Northrop 
wrote back to General McNarney : Northrop management had met 
with Convair officials, he explained, but the meeting had 
not been productive . Northrop had understood General 
McNarney ' s letter to mean that Convair would simply vacate 
the Fort Worth plant , turning everything over to Northrop . 
Not surprisingly, Convair understood nothing of the kind: 
they construed the McNarney letter to mean that Northrop 
would merely subcontract RB-49 production to them, and that 
they woul d continue to operate the Fort Worth facility . Mr . 
Northrop asked General McNarney for help i n ironing out the 
differences, but at the same time went to great length to 
deny any improper behavior by Convair : 
Under the circumstances, nothing further can be 
accomplished by conversation between Northrop and 
Convair concerning the plans for Fort Worth pro-
duct i o n of the RB-49 airplanes until the desires or 
reauirements of t h e Ai r Force are set forth more sp~cifically . . . This is especially true because 
of the friendly relations existing between the 
companies and the necessity of maintaining such 
relationships in the event that Northrop is to 
operate in the Fort Worth plant . . . It should 
be noted that Convair ' s attitude was not arbitrary 
or unreasonable . It was what might be expected 
of any business orga nization, based.on ~he l~mited 
infor mation availab l e to them at th1s t1me. 
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The Merger 
To iron out the problems generated by General 
McNarney ' s letter, a second meeting was held on July 16, 
1948. The meeting took place in Los Angeles, and was at-
tended by officials of Northrop, Convair, and the Air Force . 
Secretary of the Air Force Symington was in Los Angeles to 
fulfill a long- standing commitment to speak at the annual 
meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences. He and 
his host, Mr. John McCone of President Truman's Air Policy 
Commission, invited the Northrop-Convair- Air Force con-
ferees to Mr. McCone's house for a discussion . 18 
The group addressed the problem of producing the RB-49 
at Fort Worth . During this discussion , the possibility of a 
merger between Convair and Northrop was raised, not by the 
Air Force representatives, but by Floyd Odlum, president of 
the Atlas Corporation, parent company of Convair. 
In the course of the conversation, Mr . Odlum sug-
gested a merger between the Northrop and Consoli-
dated organizations as the best way of combining 
the Northrop engineering talent with Consolidated ' s 
production know-how . The suggestion seemed reason-
able to the Air Force representatives since North-
rop was not organized for a venture requiring as 
much capital as the quantity production of the 
(R]B- 49. 
Mr. Northrop was not in favor of a merger at 
that time and preferred an interim solution of the 
financing problem by subcontracting the production 
work to Consolidar9d . This was the solution fin-
ally agreed upon . 
Mr. Northrop ' s testimony at the 1949 House Armed 
Services Committee supports this account . After acknowledg-
ing that his firm lacked the capacity to handle the in-
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creased purchases then being contemplated , Mr . 
Northrop described the July 16 meeting: 
MR . NORTHROP : The conclusion that was arrived at 
after very lengthy discussions was that the best 
solution to the problem consisted in [sic) North-
rop subcontracting the actual construction of a 
major portion of this contract to Convair who would 
continue to operate the Fort Worth facility . 
COMMITTEE COUNSEL : . .. Did you believe that was 
the best solution? 
MR. NORTHROP: Considering all factors , yes . Con-
sidering Northrop , no . But we felt it was the 
right thing to do in view of all the circumstances 
that were presented to us . .. . 
COUNSEL: Was there any evidence of any politics in 
that deal? 
MR . NORTHROP : No, sir . . . . It appeared to us to 
be a logical solution to a difficult problem. No 
contractor gladly gives up the manufacture of his 
own product . We would have much preferred to have 
found a solution that would have prevented that re-
su 1 t. . . . 
COUNSEL : One of the prime reasons for taking that 
work away from you was to keep the Fort Worth fac-
tory busy. 
MR. NORTHROP : That is correct. 
COUNSEL : And another reason was to be sure you 
would get the accelerated output . 
MR . NORTHROP : That is correct . 
COUNSEL: But what proportion one did bear to the 
other in the solution you are unable to enlighten 
the committee. 
MR . NORTHROP : That was the point I wanted to make . 21 
Air Force Questions 
While Mr . Northrop testified that he thought the 
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arrangement was a " logical solution to a difficult problem , " 
people in the Air Force had doubts . On August 16 , 1948 , 
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exactly a month after the Los Angeles meeting, the Procure-
ment Committee of the Directorate of Procurement and Indus-
trial Planning raised two questions concerning the produc-
tion of RB-49 aircraft : 
1. Why was it necessary to involve Convair at all? 
Why couldn ' t Northrop build the planes in the Fort Worth 
plant since it was a government-owned facility? 
2 . If Convair was to be involved, why were they to 
receive only one-third of the profit, while Northrop, who 
would only produce one of the thirty planes, was scheduled 
to receive two-thirds of the profit?22 
Two days later, Col . George Schaetzel, the Chief of 
the Aircraft and Missile Section, Procurement Division, 
answered both questions. As to why Convair had to be in-
volved, his answer implied that the need to keep the Fort 
Worth plant open was the overriding consideration: 
It has been determined by HQ USAF that there is a 
strategic requirement for building B-49 type air-
planes in the Fort Worth facility . In addition, 
since it is contemplated that production of B-36s 
at this facility will be discontinued by November 
1949 [still 16 months away) it is considered imper-
ative that a large strategic airplane be built at 
that facility in order to make use of the plant and 
the production organization. . . . It would be 
very difficult to administrate [sic) this contract 
and the contract for the B-36 with both Consoli-
dated Vultee Aircraft Corporation and Northrop Air-
craft , Inc . , in the Fort Worth facility as prime 
contractors . For these reasons, the Secretary of 
the Air Force required Northrop Aircraft, Inc . , to 
subcontract the major port~on of the th~3ty (30) 
RB-49A airplanes to Consol1dated . . . . 
Regarding the second question, suggesting that the profit 
distribution was too generous to Northrop, Colonel Schaetzel 
also disagreed : 
Through the arrangement as directed by the Sec-
retary of the Air Force, Consolidated has the 
~ppo:tun~ty to maintain their production organ-
lzat lon lntact and to use the Fort Worth facility. 
The a~vantag7 to Consolidated through this arrange-
me~t 2~ far ln excess of any fee which might be 
pald . 
Summary 
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So , as the summer of 1948 waned, the situation looked 
like this : thirty RB-49s were on order , with at least the 
possibility of a great many more to be ordered in the 
future . While it was true that all but one of the air-
planes would be built by Convair at Fort Worth, the arrange-
ment seemed to have something for everyone . Northrop ' s air-
plane would finally be built, and they would receive two-
thirds of the profit . Convair would receive one-third of 
the profit , and would retain their production organization 
and the right to continue operating at Fort Worth . The Air 
Force would be able to get more airplanes faster , especia lly 
if the contemplated increase in orders took place , and the 
Air Force would maintain operation of a major aircraft 
plant . It seemed to be a solution that gave no one every -
thing they wanted, but which reasonably addressed the con-
flicting needs of Northrop, Convair, and the Air Force . 
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CHAPTER VI 
CANCELLATION OF THE RB-49 PROGRAM 
As the fall of 1948 arrived, three separate and un-
related events took place, events that would combine to put 
the RB-49 program in serious jeopardy . The first was the 
resurgence of the B-36, the giant bomber then being de-
veloped and produced by Convair. The second involved a 
change of leadership in the Strategic Air Command, in which 
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay replaced the first SAC commander, Gen . 
George C. Kenney . The third and final blow to the RB-49 
came not from the Air Force, but from President Truman, who 
imposed deep cuts in the Fiscal Year 1950 defense budget . 
The RB-49 might have survived any one, or even two, of these 
events , but the coincidence of all three proved insurmount-
able. 
Improvement of the B-36 
Like its competitor XB-35, the B-36 got its start 
before America entered World War II . The survival of 
Britain was in doubt, and American planners saw the possible 
need for a bomber capable of reaching European targets from 
bases in North America. Chief of the Army Air Corps Gen. 
H.H. Arnold explained the rationale years later, in 1949: 
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So it was only normal then that I should call to-
gether the.eng~neers in Washington, the designers, 
and the sc1ent1sts, and say, ' Now, listen . This is 
1940 . We have the B- 29s well started . It will 
come o u t before the war is over . But there is a 
next step beyon~ that . And, if unfortunately this 
war should cont1nue beyond our expectations, it may 
reach a point where we have to send a bomber from 
Labrador or from Greenland to the interior of Ger-
many . I want you fellows to go out now and think 
about an airplane, the next step beyond your B-29, 
something that will go ten thousand miles, some-
thing that will carry a five - ton load and be able to 
return to its base .' And it was the logical t~ing 
to do . It was just a natural development . . . 
Thus it was this "natural development " that spawned 
both Northrop's XB- 35 and Convair's XB-36 . Both programs 
proved extremely frustrating . Like the XB- 35 , the XB-36 
took nearly five years to make its maiden f l ight , and its 
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early fl ight test program was troublesome . The first com-
mander of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. George c . Kenney , 
had serious misgivings about the B-36, even suggesting on 
2 December 12 , 1946 that the program be halted . Original 
performance figures gave the B-36 a range of just 6 , 500 
miles , on l y marginally bet ter than Boeing ' s B- 50, a refine-
ment of the B-29 . In addition, General Kenney thought the 
3 
B-36 was too slow and vulnerable to enemy attack . 
Gen . Nathan Twining , then Commander of Air Materiel 
Command , rejected General Kenney ' s recommendation , and the 
development of the B-36 con tinued . By 1948 , General 
Twining ' s faith in the B- 36 had been vindicated: while the 
huge bomber was not without its problems, it could do things 
that no other airplane could . It was unsurpassed in its 
bomb-carrying capacity : on June 30 , 1948 , a B-36 dropped a 
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record 72,000 pounds of bombs in a test . Six months later, 
another B- 36 dropped 84,000 pounds (nearly the entire empty 
gross weight of its B- 49 competitor) from an altitude of 
35-40 , 000 feet . 4 Maximum altitudes--once a cause of 
concern to the Air Force--were also impressive : by the end 
of 1948, an experimental YB- 36 had climbed to above 46,000 
feet, well above what even the B-36 ' s supporters had thought 
possible . 5 
Bomb capacity and altitude were important, but the 
area in which the B-36 truly excelled was range. When Gen-
eral Kenney wanted to cancel the B-36 in 1946, the best 
estimates of its range were in the 6 , 500 - mile area. In 
April 1948, the first production B-36 flew more than 6 ,90 0 
miles, with a 10,000 pound bomb dropped at the midpoint of 
th . . 6 e mlSSlOn . Improvements soon followed . The next 
month, the same B-36A flew 8,062 miles, despite a malfunc -
tioning engine . Six months later , a B-36B flew a simulated 
bombing mission from Fort Worth to Hawaii , over 8 , 100 miles 
7 
with a 10,000 pound load . The B- 36 was thus proving 
itself as the only bomber capable of reaching Eurasia from 
bases in the United States, and returning , without relying 
on air refueling , which was then in its infancy . 
The last remaining concern the Air Force had was 
speed, and even that was overcome in the fall of 1948 . On 
October 5 , convair proposed a modification which would add 
four jet engines to the six propellers then powering the 
B-36A and B-36B. The result : greater speed over target . 
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Top speed would increase from 345 miles per hour (B- 36A} and 
381 miles per hour (B- 36B) to 435 miles per hour for the 
proposed jet-assisted B-360 . The added power would also 
permit higher (above 45 , 000 feet} operation , with an 
increase in weight-carrying ability of almost 30,000 
8 pounds . 
In all, the latter part of 1948 saw dramatic im-
provements in the B-36 . Even the early -A and -B models 
could carry more bombs further than any other aircraft , and 
the improvements in the jet- powered B- 360 promised even 
further advances in the future . 
The Return of General LeMay 
While the B- 36 was proving itself to be far better 
than expected , another development occurred which would 
prove instrumental in the demise of the RB- 49 . Following a 
stint as Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe , 
Gen . Curtis E. LeMay was sel ected in October 1948 to s ucceed 
General Kenney as Commander of the Strategic Air Command . A 
strong believer in strategic reconnaissance , one of General 
LeMay ' s top goals was to improve the quality of SAC ' s re-
. f 9 conna1ssa nce orce . 
When the RB-49 contract was let i n the summer of 1948, 
the F lying Wing did not have much competit ion as a recon-
naissance plane . But by the time General LeMay took over 
SAC in October , that had changed: the B- 36 , with its 
defensive firepower, improving range and altitude, and newly 
acquired speed , appeared to be a strong competitor . Further 
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damaging the RB-49's prospects was yet another stretchout in 
delivery : RB-49, version III, which would have been the 
first version to offer similar range as the B-36, was now 
not expected to be ready for production until 1952 or 1953 
(instead of the previous estimate of 1951), which would put 
it in direct competition with what was expected to be a 
superior airplane , Boeing ' s B-5 2 , then in the design 
10 
stage . 
Acting on General LeMay's wishes, General Cabell , 
Director of Intelligence, called for a conference to review, 
again, the requirements for strategic reconnaissance air-
craft . Officers representing the Air Staff, Air Proving 
Ground, Air Materiel Command , and SAC assembled on November 
12 , 1948 and released their recommendations three days 
later . Based on the improvements already shown by the B-36 , 
and based also on the projected figures for the jet-powered 
modification , the Board recommended the B-36 as its first 
choice ; second choice was a reconnaissance version of Boe-
ing ' s new B-47 , short in range but designed to be air re -
fuelable ; another Boeing entry , the B- 54 (a bloated develop-
ment of the B- 29/B- 50 series) was a distant third choice . 
The RB-49 was not included at all . Major General F . H. 
Smith , Jr . testified to the House Armed Services Committee 
in 1949 : 
Between the summer of 1948 and the time of the re-
connaissance meeting in November, a number of de-
velopments occurred which made the B- 49 series look 
less promising in comparison with other air~lanes . 
For one thing , the Air Staff felt less conf1dent 
about the early avai lability of the B-49 as a bomber 
Its aer~dynamic design as a tailless airplane 
caus~d 1t to ~aw and pitch . . . requiring a more 
prec1se autop1lot than is needed for conventional 
airplanes . 
It had other shortcomings , such as l ack of arma-
ment . Minor problems of this sort are usual in a 
radically new design and undoubtedly could be over-
come in time . . . [but] they were sufficient to 
cause Air Materiel Command to recommend postponing 
development .. . 1~ntil further flight tests had been made . . . . 
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How could the RB- 49 be satisfactory in the summer of 
1948 , and unsatisfactory just a few months later? Part of 
the answer lies in shortcomings of the RB-49-- the crash at 
Muroc , instability, short range, poor armament--but the B- 36 
had its share of such problems, and more . Still, much was a 
result of the B-36 ' s remarkable resurgence , specifically in 
bomb- carrying ability , altitude, and range . As General 
Smith went on to explain to the House Armed Services Commit-
tee, the RB-49 wasn ' t bad , but the Air Force, SAC, and 
General LeMay felt the B- 36/RB-36 was better : 
The characteristics of an airplane cannot be 
judged on an absolute basis; they must be compared 
with the characteristics of other airplanes expected 
to be available at the same time . The shortcomings 
of the RB-49 in themselves did not argue against 
procurement of that airplane . In the summer of 
1948, they seemed acceptable because the [R]B-49 
did not have much competition as a reconnaissance 
airplane . In the fall of 1948, the B- 36 had demon-
strated outstanding performance capabilities and 
was certainly superior to the current version of 
the [R]B-49. Future versions of the [R]B-49 would 
not be available for several years , at which time 
they would be in competition with ot£zr models , ex-
pected to be equally good or better . 
Budgetary Limitations 
The third strike against the RB-49 came not from the 
Air Force, but rather from President Truman himself. The 
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problem stemmed r.ot from any doubts about the RB-49, but 
instead reflected President Truman's desire to maintain a 
"pay as you go, " deficit-free defense posture, especially in 
time of peace: 
As county judge, senator, and President, I consist-
ently kept in mind the same sort of tax philosophy . 
It w~s.a pay-as-you-go program, except in emergency 
condltlons . . . . There is nothing sacred about 
the pay-as-you-go idea so far as I am concerned, 
except that it represents1 jhe soundest principle of financing that I know. 
In 1947 , the Air Force strength had stood at forty-
eight combat groups. By late 1948, amid the tension caused 
by Soviet actions around Berlin, that number had been in-
creased to fifty-nine, with an ultimate goal of seventy 
fully-equipped combat units . The contracts awarded in 1948 
(including the contract to Northrop for thirty RB-49s) were 
14 geared toward supporting this seventy-group force. 
But despite the Berlin situation, President Truman 
refused to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff budget pro-
posals for Fiscal Year 1950 . The Services' own estimate of 
their needs for FY 1950 was 23 . 8 billion dollars. 15 
President Truman, though, imposed a ceiling of 14.4 billion 
dollars, or a little more than half the Services' de-
sires . 16 Clearly , the " pay- as - you-go " concept was at 
work . In a letter , Defense Secretary James Forrestal summed 
up the problem : 
. .. Our biggest headache at the moment, of.c~urse, 
is the budget . The President has set th~ celllng at 
14 billion 4 against the pared down requlrements 
that we put in of 16 billion 9. I am frank to say, 
however, that I have the greatest sympathy for him 
because he is determined not to spend more than we 
make in taxes. 17He is a hard money man if ever I 
saw one . . . . 
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On December 9 , the Service secretaries and the Joint 
Chiefs met with President Truman. The President listened to 
their arguments, but remained firm : 14.4 billion dollars was 
to remain as the FY 1950 defense ceiling. 18 The impact 
on the Air Force's seventy group expansion was devastating: 
instead of building from fifty-nine to seventy groups in 
FY 1950, suddenly the Air Force had to cut eleven units, 
dropping from fifty-nine back to the original forty-eight 
groups . 19 
The impact was especially felt in the Strategic Air 
Command . SAC ' s long range bombers and reconnaissance craft 
were expected to represent much of the previously projected 
increase . Now not only would that increase be forgone, but 
SAC would likely have to share in the cutbacks of already 
existing forces. Forrestal expressed his concern in a 
November 1948 memo, one of a series called "Points for the 
President " : 
Throughout my recent trip to Europe I was increas-
ingly impressed by the fact that the only balance 
that we have against the overwhelming manpower of 
the Russians, and therefore the chief deterrent to 
war , is the threat of the immediate retaliation 
with the atomic bomb . I have substantial misgiv-
ings that reduction of the potential of the Air 
Force in the long range bombing field might be mis-
understood both by the w~5ld at large and particu-
larly by our only enemy . 
Despite reservations as to the wisdom of the budget 
cuts, the Air Force set to work to implement the force re-
ductions . With the new forty-eight-group ceiling, a number 
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of programs , planned or in existence , would need to be cut 
back . To recommend exactly where adjustments should be 
made, a group of top Air Force decision makers were called 
together . The group was called the Senior Officers Board . 
Senior Officers Board 
The first meeting of the Senior Officers Board began 
on December 29 , 1948 . There were to be only four voting 
members : Gen . Muir S . Fairchild, Air Force Vice Chief of 
Staff; General McNarney, still Commander of Air Materiel 
Command ; Lt . Gen . How.ard Craig, Deputy Chief of Staff , 
Materiel ; and Lt . Gen . Lauris Norstad , Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Plans and Operations. General Fairchild became ill , 
so General McNarney chaired the meeting . 21 The main 
witness at th i s first Seni or Officers Board was the new SAC 
Commander, General LeMay , supported by members of his staff . 
At the meeting , he asked for the ability to restructure his 
force , eliminating some purchases whil e increasing others . 
His desires were simple : more and better-equipped B-36s. To 
buy thirty-nine additional B-36s , some as bombers and some 
as reconnaissance planes , and to mod i fy (specifically , add 
jets to) ninety-four of the original B- 36s would cost 
$269 , 761 , 000 . 22 General LeMay explained his desires for 
the B- 36 to the House Armed Services Committee in 1949 : 
COMMITTEE COUNSEL : And the reason that you so advo-
cated the procurement of these additional B- 36 air-
planes, will you state that briefly to this commit-
tee? 
GENERAL LEMAY : I now r epresent the people who flew 
our bombers in the las t war . Some of them are still 
around in the Air Force . They are the ones who are 
going to fly the bomber missions if you call on us 
a~a in.to fight . It is my job to know what they 
l~ke ~n the way of equipment and what they can do 
Wlth lt . . . . We have a requirements committee 
that is constantly making recommendations to me on 
equipment . They made a recommendation to me that 
the B-36 was the best possible airplane that we 
could procure to do our job, and I agreed with 
them, and I made that recommendatio2 3to the Senior Officers Board and it was approved . 
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To get his B-36 bombers and RB-36 reconnaissance air-
craft , General LeMay offered to forgo other aircraft pur-
chases . Among the airplanes deemed expendable were 
Northrop's RB-49s . As General Smith explained : 
General LeMay . . . testified that an increase of 
two groups of B-36 bombers (at the expense of two 
medium [Boeing B- 50] bomb groups) and a strategic 
reconnaissance group of RB-36s (in lieu of the 
RB-49 type) would greatly enhance his ability to 
launch a strategic offensive . The board approved 
this recommendation and recommended that the funds 
made available by any cancellations be devoted to 
implementing2~he recommendations of the Strategic Air Command. 
To raise the $269 , 761,000 needed for the B-36/RB-36 
purchases , the first Senior Officers Board recommended can-
cellation of six separate weapon systems involving four cor-
porations . It should be noted that Convair suffered some 
loss, although far less than the others . It must also be 
noted that North American, not Northrop , suffered by far the 
h . 1 25 eavlest osses : 
MANUFACTURER AIRCRAFT NUMBER AMOUNT OF CANCELLATION 
North American B- 45 51 $105,300,000 
North American F-93 118 57,930,000 
Northrop RB-49 30 88,500,000 
Northrop C-125 30 8,940 , 000 
Kellett H-10 10 6,831 , 000 
Convair YT-32 1 2 , 260 , 000 
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On January 11, 1949 , the recommendations of the Senior 
Officers Board were implemented. A telegram from Air Mater-
iel Command to Northrop formally cancelled the production of 
the RB-49 : 
In anticipation of receipt of formal termination 
notice, the contractor is directed to stop all 
work authorized . .. with the exception of the 
engineering, fabrication, and flighi6test applic-able to the YRB- 49A airplane . ... 
The last part of the cancellation notice is most 
significant . Contrary to the claims made by reporter Clete 
Roberts , that the planes, "each and every last one of them, " 
were ordered scrapped by the Air Force , we can see here that 
the YRB-49 test program was ordered continued . On May 4, 
1950, more than a year after the cancellation and just after 
the ground accident that destroyed the only surviving YB-49 
bomber, the YRB-49 made its first flight from Hawthorne to 
Edwards Air Force Base27 where the Air Force intended to 
use it as an experimental vehicle : 
This airplane will be used as a photo reconnais-
sance prototype . It is planned to accomplish such 
flight tests as are necessary to evaluate the air-
plane ... after which tests the airplane will be 
turned over to the Photographic Laboratory for 
testing new photographic equipment und~r hig~ 8speed , 
high altitude conditions . Tota l quant1ty-1. 
Epilog 
The res t of the history of the single YRB- 49 is murky, 
much of it lost due to incomplete Air Force records after 
the cancellation . Following the ground accident which de-
stroyed the sole surviving YB-49 on March 15 , 1950, the six-
engine YRB-49 became the last exist i ng full - si ze Flying 
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wing. After its maiden flight on May 4, 1950, the YRB-49 
entered flight test as planned, only to encounter stability 
problems similar to those which had plagued its bomber 
predecessors . It was flown to Ontario, California, where a 
stability augmentation system was to be installed . Once 
again, funding was apparently cut and the last of the big 
Flying Wings was relegated to outside storage in the grape 
vineyards surrounding the Ontario airport . In October 1953 , 
nearly five years after t he cancellation of the RB-49 
production program, Air Force crews from nearby Norton Air 
29 Force Base cut up the YRB-49 for scrap . The last of 
the large Flying Wings wa s gone . 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESPONSES TO MR . NORTHROP ' S STATEMENT: SENIOR AIR FORCE 
LEADERSHIP AND CURRENT NORTHROP MANAGEMENT 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that the 
written h i storical record points toward a variety of com-
petitive, technical, and economic considerations which 
worked against the procurement of the Flying Wings. But Mr . 
Northrop in the 1980 interview said that those factors were 
not the causes of the cancellation . Instead , according to 
Mr . Northrop and his former chairman , Mr . Millar, the can-
cellations grew directly from their refusal to merge their 
corporation with Convair, as they claimed Mr . Symington 
demanded. We have seen Mr . Northrop's account : 
MR. NORTHROP : I got a telephone call a few days 
later from Mr . Symington . He said , " I am can-
celling all your Flying Wing aircraft . " And I 
said , "Oh , Mr . Secretary, why? " And he said, " I've 
had an adverse report , " and hung up . That was the 
last time I ever talked to him, and the last time 
we could ever reach him by phone or any other way . 
ROBERTS: Did he give the contract to someone else? 
MR . NORTHROP: He continued the construction of the 
B-36 by Consolidated Vultee in Fort Worth . 
ROBERTS: So , in fact, the contract was taken away 
from you, and given to Consolidated because you had 
refused to merge with Consolidated as you were or-
dered to do by the government, is that accurate? 
. 1 
MR . NORTHROP: That is absolutely accurate . 
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We have also seen that in the same broadcast, Mr . 
Millar confirmed the hostile tone of the meeting : 
MR. ROBERTS : Mr . Millar , did you fear reprisal? 
MR. MILLAR : Yes . . .. the meeting with Mr . 
Symington was so, shall I say, brutal .. . bare-
faced ... so obviously, if you will, a power play 
that you almost had to assume that he would be pre-
pared to take further st2ps if we didn't go as good 
boys and go along . . . . 
In my research , I have taken Mr . Northrop's and Mr . 
Millar ' s statements, and have attempted to find evidence 
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that would either corroborate or refute them . This chapter 
first looks at the senior Air Force leadership of that day, 
to get their perspective . In gathering information for this 
portion , I interviewed Sen . Stuart Symington , both by 
telephone and at his horne in New Canaan, Connecticut; Gen . 
Curtis E . LeMay, former Commander of the Strategic Air 
Command and Air Force Chief of Staff, at his horne in Newport 
Beach, California; Gen . Lauris Norstad, former Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Plans and Operations, and the only surviving 
member of the 1949 Senior Officers Board, by telephone from 
his horne near Tucson, Arizona; and finally Gen . Elwood P . 
Quesada, former Commander of the Tactical Air Command and 
former chief of the Federal Aviation Administration, 
interviewed at the United States Air Force Academy . 
In addition to the perspectives provided by the former 
Air Force leaders, this chapter also includes statements by 
the current Northrop Corporation's top executive. Thomas V. 
Jones, Northrop ' s Chairman of the Board, contacted me by 
telephone specifically to c larify the position of today ' s 
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Northrop management. 
Several questions form the structure of this chapter: 
1 . Did the meeting take place as Mr . Northrop and Mr. 
Millar describe? 
2 . Did Mr. Symington discuss a possible merger with 
Northrop and Convair representatives? 
3 . In discussing such a merger, did Mr . Symington 
give Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar reason to fear repr i sal if 
the merger was not carried out? 
4 . Even if Mr . Symington had wanted to cause damage 
to Northrop by cancelling the Flying Wing, was he in a posi-
tion to do so? 
5 . Did Northrop and its Flying Wing get a fair 
trial? 
The answer s to these questions will go a long way 
toward destroying some of the myths surrounding the Flying 
Wing ' s demise . 
Question One : Did the meeting take place as 
Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar describe? 
We saw in Chapter I that Mr. Northrop described the 
momentous meeting this way : 
The same day that General McNarney . . . came to my 
office with that additiona l order for thirty-five 
airplanes . .. Mr. Millar and I were requested to 
visit Mr . Symington . At that meeting, he lectured 
u s rather lengthily on the difficulties of a Secre-
tary for Air in keeping things in hand, and told us 
that he did not want to sponsor any new aircraft 
companies entering the business and having to be 
supplied with business over the years , and that he 
wanted us without question to merge with Consoli -
dated Vultee , which was then operating a government-
owned plant in Fort Worth, building the B-36 · · · · 
Afte: th~ lengthy diatribe on Mr . Symington's part, 
I sa1d, Mr . Secretary, what are the alternatives 
to thi~ demand you'r~ making of our merger with 
Consol1dated Vultee? And he said, "Alternatives? 
You'll be goddamned sorry if you don ' t ! " 
General McNarney said, "Oh, Mr. Secretary, you 
don't ~ean that the way it sounds," a~d Mr. Syming-
ton sa1d, "You ' re damned right I do. " 
There is no doubt that the meeting took place . Mr . 
Northrop testified to it in the 1949 House Armed services 
Committee hearings, as did Floyd Odlum of Convair and 
General F . H. Smith, Jr . , who delivered the Air Force's 
4 
statement. But apparently Mr . Northrop's statement as 
to who demanded the meeting was incorrect: the person who 
instigated the meeting was not Mr. Symington, but Mr . 
Northrop himself . To work out the confusion caused by 
General McNarney's letter concerning movement of RB-49 
production to Fort Worth , Mr. Northrop had asked for 
clarification . According to General Smith ' s testimony , 
In response to General McNarney ' s suggestion, Con-
solidated held initial conferences with Northrop 
officials . . . on July 9 , 1948. On the same date 
Northrop notified General McNarney that in the pre-
liminary meetings with Consolidated, several points 
had arisen which needed clarification . . . . Early 
action by Air Materiel Command was requested. 
Mr. Northrop followed up his letter with a verb-
al request fo r a round- table discussion . . . . In 
response to this request, General McNarney and Gen. 
K. B . Wolfe of Air Materiel Command went to Los 
Angeles on July 15, 1948 . . . . At the time of 
this conference , the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. 
Symington , was on the west coast to fi l l a long 
standing engagem5nt to be the principal speaker at 
a dinner . . . . 
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Mr. Northrop , in his own 1949 testimony , confirmed that it 
was he who asked for the meeting: 
we suggested a meeting of the principals involved 
wherein the questions concerning the production ' 
could be resolved . That meeting was h5ld in Los 
Angeles on the 16th day of July . ... 
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These statements must cause at least some skepticism 
regarding Mr . Northrop's claim that Mr. Symington demanded 
the meeting, presumably so he could order the Northrop/ 
convair merger . But here we see that Mr. Northrop himself 
asked for the meeting . If Mr . Symington really intended to 
improperly force Northrop to accede to a merger, would it be 
logical for him to wait until Mr . Northrop got around to 
asking to get together? Even more disturbing is the coinci-
dence of the speaking engagement: were Mr. Symington not 
already committed to be on the west coast, he most likely 
would not have been involved at all. These facts would 
certainly seem to argue against any premeditated conspiracy 
between Mr . Symington and Convair. 
In 1983 , Mr . Symington could not recall the Los 
Angeles meeting . Thus , he did not recall who asked for the 
conference, and was "almost certain " it was held in his 
7 
office at the Pentagon . 
Question Two: Did Mr . Symington discuss a possibl e 
merger with Northrop and Convair representatives? 
The answer to this is a probable "yes ." We have 
already seen the testimony of General Smith in which he said 
that at the July 16, 1948 meeting , 
Mr . Odlum suggested a merger ... ~s the best ~ay 
of combining the Northrop engineer1ng talent w1t~ 
Consolidated's production know-how . The sugge~t1on8 
seemed reasonable to the Air Force representat1ves . 
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Since Mr. Symington was the leading "Air Force repre-
sentative," at least at part of the meeting , it seems rea-
sonable to assume he took part in the discussions . Inter-
viewed in 1982 , Senator Symington could clearly recall dis-
cussing the Flying Wing with Mr. Northrop, but was not sure 
exactly when or where the conversation took place . A 
possible merger might very well have been discussed : 
The Air Force Chief [General Vandenberg, Chief of 
Staff] wanted the B-3 6 and it was up to me to get 
it . Now you know, of course , that there was a 
tremendous amount of overcapacity in the industry 
following World War II. It was clear that many of 
the smaller companies would not survive . Northrop 
carne to see me , and said that unless he received 
his Flying Wing orders, his company would be in 
serious trouble . I knew at that time that the Air 
Force favored the B-36, built by Convair . I may 
very well have suggested that he merge his company 
with Convair , who we knew was going to get business. 
I may have suggested he go see Dutch Kindleberger 
at North American, or Bill Allen at Boeing . What 
I ' m saying is t his: I may very well have suggested 
Northrop talk with Convair about a merger . I ' m 
quite certain, though, that I never would9have discussed such a merger with Floyd Odlum . 
Question Three: In discussing such a merger, did Mr . 
Symington give Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar reason to 
fear reprisal if the merger was not carried out? 
Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar have made their state-
ments; Senator Symington has no recollec tion of ever saying 
anything that could have been construed by Mr. Northrop and 
Mr. Millar as a threat . But even if one were to assume he 
did make such a comment , there seem to be at least two 
possible interpretations. The fir s t is that of Mr. Northrop 
and Mr . Millar: that they were being forced to merge , 
against their will, with a competitor . The second 
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interpretation is equally plausible, and much more innocent . 
Since Mr. Symington apparently knew from Mr. Northrop that 
his compa ny could be in trouble without the RB-49 order, and 
since he knew also that Convair would be getting more 
business, the statement could be construed as a fair assess-
ment of the post- war aircraft manufacturer situation: only 
the strongest would survive, and the likely result of 
Northrop ' s remaining s ma l l and independent would be 
bankruptcy. 
In the absence of proof , one has to look at tenden-
cies. Would it have been out of character for Mr . Symington 
to have indicated that Mr . Northrop would "be goddamned 
sorry " if he didn ' t merge? Gen . Elwood P . Quesada , a long 
time associate of Senator Symington, a former head of the 
Federal Aviation Administration and now Board Chairman of 
L ' Enfant Plaza complex in Washington, D.C . , had this to say : 
I've known Senator Symington a long while, and I 
know of a number of occasions where he , like others , 
could have enriched himself at the public expense . 
He never did, never even was interested . 
At the same time, though , it would be completely 
in character for him to blow his top and yell at 
someb ody , even something like the " You ' ll be damned 
sorry if you don ' t ," remar~ · He ' s got something of 
a temper , you know .... 
Gen . Curtis LeMay painted a similar picture of Senator 
Symington, that of a volatile man who was inclined sometimes 
to act on a problem first, and think about it later : 
I remember for some time a big argument was going on 
with the Navy about the B-36 . . . . The Navy had a 
new jet fighter then , they said it could s~oot [the 
B-36] down ... the Banshee, they called 1t . · · 
and we were discussing that with Symington~ wh;ther 
a fighter could shoot down a bomber . I sa1d , Yeah , 
a.fighter can shoot a bomber down, sure it can . Any 
f1ghter can shoot any bomber down, if it's as fast . 
But it may not be conducive to long life and happi-
ness. The only way to prove it is to put the B-36 
and the Banshee up and to fight it out . " So, Syming-
ton then comes out with a statement that we would 
fight out a battle with real bullets with the Ban-
shee and the B-~6 ... . 1¥e was like that, things I never could f1gure out . 
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Even accepting the possibility that Mr. Symington made a 
statement that implied that Northrop would regret a failure 
to merge , it seems to be almost certain that such a state-
ment was not intended as a threat . 
Interviewed in 1983, Senator Symington called "pre-
posterous and absurd " the idea that he would threaten a firm 
in an open meeting , with many others present : 
If there ' s one thing I learned in all my years in 
government, it's that it's impossible to keep a 
secret. You ' ve got twenty people working for you, 
and they each go home and tell twenty people, and 
pretty soon it ' s all over town. It may take a 
while , but yoy 2can't keep a thing like that a 
secret . . . . 
Still another factor which must be considered is the 
presence of General McNarney. A long-time aide to Gen . 
George Marshall, General McNarney was a man of high integ-
rity, and a man who maintained a very formal relationship 
with Mr . Symington . According to Senator Symington, this 
was especially true because of a situation the previous 
year , when Air Force Chief of Staff "Tooey " Spaatz came to 
the Secretary of the Air Force to announce his intention to 
retire. General Spaatz asked for Mr. Symington's opinion on 
a successor , but Mr. Symington declined, saying he felt it 
was a military decision, best left for military men. 
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Together, Spaatz and Symington took the case to General 
Eisenhower , then advisor to the Joint Chiefs of staff. 
Eisenhower studied the records of the two main candidates, 
Generals McNarney and Vandenberg, and chose Vandenberg , 
based on his strong combat r ecord . From then on, according 
to Senator Symington, General McNarney maintained a distant, 
formal relationship, perhaps surmising that Mr . Symington 
'bl f h' 1 ° 13 was r esponsl e or ~s non-se ectlon . 
With this in mind, we see that the conference of July 
16, 1948 , did not contain a great many of Mr . Symington's 
friends : Convair representatives may have been neutral , but 
Northrop people blamed him (indirectly at least) for the 
transfer of production to Fort Worth, and his one organiza -
tional ally , General McNarney , felt that the Secretary was 
responsible for his passover. Does it seem log ical that Mr. 
Symington would choose this environment to make an improper 
demand on Northrop? 
And if for some reason he had made the demand, why 
would General McNarney remain silent? Even Mr . Northrop did 
not blame General McNarney , who supposedly said, " Mr . Secre-
tary , you don ' t mean that the way it sounds," when Mr . 
Symington was alleged to have made the "You ' ll be goddamned 
sorry if you don't ! " comment . Are we to believe that the 
late General McNarney , too, was part of the conspiracy to 
harm Northrop? If not , wouldn't he have spoken up? 
Skeptics will point out that General McNarney went on to 
work for Convair , but that was after his retirement, almost 
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two years later . Several of the people involved absolutely 
reject the idea that General McNarney would allow himself to 
be entangled in anything that even approached unethical 
behavior . Senator Symington, despite the coolness that 
developed after General McNarney was not selected as Chief 
of Staff , says : 
General McNarney was a right arm for Gen . George 
Marshall during World War II, a brilliant man of 
spotless integrity . Any implication that for 
personal reasons he would be " biaf~d " to a supplier 
is an insult to a great American. 
General Quesada echoed the same sentiments: 
Joe McNarney was the straightest of the straight 
arrows, a real gentleman . If the world were fair, 
he would have been Air Force Chief of Staff, and he 
should have been . But he'd been shunted into staffs 
jobs instead of command positions in World War II. 
And Gen . Lauris Norstad, the sole surviving member of Gen -
eral McNarney ' s Senior Officers Board , said: 
I knew him well . There was never a better disci-
plined officer , a more straight-laced officer than 
Joe MI~arney . There's no skullduggery involved 
here . 
So we can see that a merger was discussed , and Mr . 
Symington most likely took part in that discussion , largely 
because he happened to be in the Los Angeles area at the 
time . We have seen that , according to his close associates , 
it would not be inconceivable for him to make a remark of 
the general tone described by Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar . 
But at the same time , even were the comment made, it would 
appear extremely unlikely that Secretary Symington was 
threatening Northrop , for several reasons . First , that he 
was even there was pure coincidence, since Mr . Northrop was 
91 
the one who asked for the meeting, at a time in which Mr . 
Symington happened to be in Los Angeles . second, the 
meeting was a fairly open affair with at least six (and 
perhaps as many as a dozen) people present , few of whom were 
especially friendly to Mr . Symington. Finally, improper 
behavior would necessarily implicate General McNarney, who 
not even Mr . Northrop implied was in any way unethical . 
Question Four: Even if Mr. Symington had wanted to cause 
damage to Northrop by cancelling the Flying Wing, 
was he in a position to do so? 
Perhaps surprisingly , the answer to this is almost 
certainly " no " . Determination of military requirements--
such as which airplane to buy--was not part of the Secre-
tary's job . According to Senator Symington, when he took 
over the Secretary ' s position, he made clear to the Air 
Force Chief of Staff , General Spaatz, that he could offer 
two things to the fledgling Air Force . First was his 
business experience : as pres i dent of a number of corpora-
tions , including Emerson Electric, Mr . Symington could 
provide a unique and needed perspective to Air Force 
decision making . Second , Mr. Symington could push for Air 
Force requirements on Capitol Hill. But the determination 
of those requirements was the responsibility of the military 
Air Force Chief and his staff, not the Secretary of the Air 
Force . 17 Specifically , Senator Symington denied ever 
cancelling the Flying wing or any other aircraft that had 
been recommended by the Air Force Chief: 
Not once, as Assistant Secretary of War for Air or 
later as Se~retary of the Air Force, did I ever' 
cancel a~ alrcraft that had been recommended to me 
by the Alr Force. If any recommendation to pur-
chase the Flyi~g Wing had re~ghed my desk, I would 
have approved lt. None did . 
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Senator Symington's contention that he always approved 
the military-developed recommendations may seem a bit 
disingenuous. It certainly was not believed by at least one 
aircraft manufacturer, who tried to influence the Secretary 
to buy a particular bomber in 1948. When Mr. Symington 
demurred, citing the fact that such a decision was not his 
to make, the manufacturer brought in a powerful Senator to 
help argue his case, this time to both Mr . Symington and 
General Vandenberg . It was General Vandenberg who con-
firmed that the decision was a military one, and that the 
. 1 h d b d ld . b . d 19 alrp ane a een, an wou contlnue to e, re)ecte . 
We have seen already that the procurement decision 
process in the Air Force moved from the bottom to the top, 
as in the case of the B-36: General LeMay's staff made re-
commendations to him, and he in turn made recommendations to 
the Senior Officers Board. The Senior Officers Board made 
recommendations to the Chief of Staff, with final ratifica-
tion by the Secretary of the Air Force. This means that 
even if the Secretary wanted to affect a decision , there 
were but two practical avenues open : first, he could modify 
a recommendation made to him by the Chief; second, he 
could try to tamper with the process further down the line , 
at the level of the using commmand , in this case, the 
Strategic Air Command . 
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Two perspectives on this show that Mr . Symington 
apparently did neither . Gen. Lauris Norstad was Deputy 
chief of Staff for Plans and Operations dur ing Mr . Syming-
ton's tenure as Secretary; he is also the only surviving 
member of the 1949 Senior Officers Board which approved 
General LeMay's request for more B- 36s in lieu of the Flying 
Wings . His statements support Mr . Symington completely : 
Mr. Symington never pressured me or any senior 
officers of the Air Force. It was my position to 
make recommendations and I did . Generally, he 
accepted my recommendations . Sometimes he asked 
for more information . But never, never did he 
suggest we change our requirements , or go with a 
different airplane, or a different company . All of 
this was in my bailiwick, because my job was to 
develop requirements, and the B- 36 was the only air-
plane , then or for the foreseeable 20uture, that 
coul d meet the requirements .... 
And General Norstad confirmed the bottom- up nature of the 
procurement process . Talking about Mr . Symington : 
In no way did he ever generate requirements . Those 
came from 2Te, and they came to me from the using 
commands . 
If there was no pressure on the senior officers of the 
Air Staff , it seems then that the using command, SAC, would 
be the next logical place to examine . But Gen . Curtis 
LeMay , then Commander of the Strategic Air Command, denies 
ever receiving pressure from Mr . Symington or anyone else, 
regarding the Flying Wing or the B-36: 
No, I got no pressure on any particular airpla~2· 
Wouldn ' t have paid any attention to it anyway. 
Regarding why he opted for the B-36 in lieu of the 
Flying Wings, General LeMay indicated that it was simply 
that the B- 36 was the only airplane that could do the job he 
needed to do: 
I don't remember ever having any choice in the 
matter . The B- 36 was it , and what we were pushing . 
I do~'t think [the Flying Wings] were even in the 
runn1.ng . · · · [The B-36] wasn't the best airplane 
in the world , no . We did have a lot of troubles 
w~th it , tro~ble with the gunnery system , trouble 
w1.t~ the eng1.nes , exhaust stacks kept burning out 
on 1.t , but we were able to keep it in the air .. .. 
We finally hung some more jet engines on the air-
plane , got more altitude out of it , better perform-
ance . . . so that during its life i t furnished us 
with a weapo~ 3 system that would have done the job 
a t the time . 
Question Five : Did Northrop and its Flying Wing 
get an unbiased trial? 
The answer is almost certainly "yes" . In a 1982 
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interview , Senator Symington indicated that not only did he 
have nothing against Northrop, but that in 1951, two years 
after the cancellation, he saved Northrop fr om bankruptcy : 
But here ' s the real irony . The President in 1 951 
asked me to go straighten out some problems in the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation . Shortly after 
getting to the RFC, some ... RFC people came to 
see me with a recommendation that we call in some 
RFC loans Northrop had. I'm quite sure that would 
have bankrupted Northrop at the time . I decided 
instead that we should have one of our people put on 
the Northrop Board of Directors . I contacted North-
rop , and suggested they accept James Allen on their 
Board . They didn ' t like that, but I told them it 
was that or we called the RFC loans . Jim Allen got 
on the board . Several years later , after To~ J~~es 
took over at Northrop, those loans were repa1.d. 
General Norstad said that in his opinion , the charge of Mr. 
Northrop and Mr. Millar had 
utterly no basis and I'd swear it was incorrect . · · · 
There wa s no skullduggery involved . _I knew2 ~ll the 
cast of characters , and it ' s inconce1.vable . 
Genera l Quesada also disregards the claims . Asked if he did 
not believe Mr . Northrop's story, he res ponded : 
I believe Mr. Northrop was an old man, not, from 
what I have heard, entir?~Y well. No, I don't be-
lieve it for an instant . 
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General LeMay similarly professed disbelief . While express-
ing some skepticism about politicians in general, he tended 
to attribute the problems to a clash of personalities: 
Well, I'm kind of a pessimistic guy : all these poli-
ticians have a lower order of moral value than I 
think they should have but I don't think this would 
have been tried by anyone . . .. 
I don ' t believe any of it. Mr. Northrop , maybe 
he did believe it, but I don't think anybody gets 
mad at any particular company that's got something 
to sell to the armed services. You may not like 
what they sell, and you don't buy it, but to go and 
be vindictive about it after you've refused their 
product , no . You ' ve too many other things to do to 
start fiddling around with that . You ' ve got too 
much to think about with the successful guy, to make 
sure he gets out a product that meets your expecta-
tions .. 
There may have been hard feelings between North-
rop and Symington. I could understand that. Syming-
ton wasn't the most likeable guy in the world . . 27 I never knew exactly what he was thinking . ... 
Comments of Current Northrop Management 
We have seen the statements of the Air Force leaders 
involved in the cancellation decision . Those statements 
unanimously tend to support Mr . Symington's position, and to 
refute the allegations of Mr. Northrop and Mr . Millar. 
Skeptics will point out that such solidarity among the 
Air Force participants may not be altogether surprising . 
After all, the reputation of the organization to which all 
of these men have devoted the major part of their lives was 
under fire . wouldn't it be possible , one might ask, for 
these men--either together or separately, consciously or 
subconsciously- -to distort the circumstances surrounding the 
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Flying Wing cancellation? 
In consideration of these arguments, r tried on a 
number of occasions to elicit a response from officials of 
today ' s Northrop Corporation . My efforts were, for a long 
time , unsuccessful : even people who had helped me on 
previous projects were unable to cooperate on the Flying 
Wing story . 
Then , shortly before the completion of this disserta-
tion , I was contacted by Mr . Thomas V. Jones , past President 
and now Chairman of the Board of Northrop Corporation . Mr. 
Jones explained that he had instructed Northrop employees to 
refrain from comment because he believed that none of his 
current people could possibly know the real truth behind the 
1949 cancellation . Mr . Jones explained that, in his ex-
perience, any cancellation brings forth strong emotional 
reactions in those people associated with the terminated 
project . The Flying Wings were certainly no exception, and 
Mr. Jones did not want his people making pub l ic statements 
based on such emotionally- charged beliefs . He went on to 
point out that no one currently in his firm, himself in-
eluded, is in a position to comment on the specifics of Mr . 
Northrop ' s charge : 
This was in the past , and none of us now involved 
in the Corporation were t here . . . . I have no 
direct knowledge, nor do any of our peo~le ~gve any 
knowledge , of what caused the cancellat~on . 
But if Mr . Jones has no specific knowledge of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the cancellation thirty-five years 
ago , he does have strong feelings about the man accused by 
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hl.·s firm ' s founder . Accordl.'ng toM J r . ones, he has never 
had any reason to doubt the integrity of Stuart Symington, 
despite Mr. Northrop's allegations: 
I have been a friend , a close friend of Stu 
. ' Sym1.ngton for a long time . Stu ' s record stands on 
its own . He has always been upstanding and fair 
in his dealings with us , and I have no reason to 
believe he wasn ' t upstanding and fair in this [the 
Flying Wing] case. I would serve as a character 
witness for him any day, but as far as the speci-
fics of [the cancellation] are concerned , r can 
give no testimony . Or , rather, I guess you ' d say 
my testimony would be inadmissable . I have spent 
a lot of time thinking how I could do something to 
ease the hurt that this thing has 2~used Stu, but 
I really don ' t know what I can do . 
Summary 
Like any investigator, one has to assess two factors: 
motive and opportunity . Did Mr. Symington have the motive 
to cancel the thirty RB-49s? And if he did, was it in his 
power to do so? 
It seems that the answer to both questions is " no" . 
As far as motive , no one wil l probably ever satisfy the 
backers of John Northrop that there was not some arrange-
ment, some under-the-table deal, between Mr. Symington and 
Convair . Mr . Northrop ' s backers will point to the alleged 
threat and see not a burst of temper, but a deeper and far 
more sinister conspiracy. The opinions of men like Generals 
LeMay , Norstad , and Quesada--even with the support offered 
by Northrop ' s Thomas Jones - -will not convince skeptics that 
Mr . Symington is not guilty. 
But the second half of the problem, that of opportun-
ity , must make the most skeptical observer pause . Not only 
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does Senator Symington claim that he let military men make 
military decisions, but his statement is backed up by all 
the military men who were most involved in those decisions. 
At the House Armed Services Committee hearings in 
1949, Mr . Symington responded to a Committee member who had 
made charges of corruption, while at the same time making 
full use of Congressional immunity : 
. . . It did not make any difference to the Air 
Force , or to me about the attacks which have been 
made against our intelligence . It is very possible 
that we might have bought this airplane [the B- 36], 
and I believe in it , and been wrong, but when people 
say that the entire High Command of the Air Force is 
dishonest--and if that is true, it means a mass con-
spiracy or ~gthing-- I take very bitter exception to 
that .... 
The situation is the same today . To disbelieve 
Senator Symington is to accept the idea that the whole top 
leadership of the Air Force at that time was either hood-
winked by a corrupt few , or all involved in a conspiracy to 
boost Convair at Northrop's expense . If one does not accept 
one of those premises , and the additional premise that the 
surviving leaders are still carrying on the deception, one 
has to harbor serious doubts about Mr. Northrop's interpre-
tation of the cancellation . 
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Chapter VII Footnotes 
1
"The Flying Wing--What Happened to It?" There 
are a few problems here . First, Mr . Northrop said he got 
the call cancelling the Wings "a few days" after he turned 
down Convair's merger offer . But we know from testimony 
before the 1949 House Armed Services Committee by Major 
General F . H. Smith, Jr ., Mr . Northrop , and others that 
Northrop de~lined to merge on July 16, 1948, preferring the 
subcontract1ng arrangement for building the RB-49 at Fort 
Worth . But the cancellation occurred in January of 1949, 
six months later . The passing of six months, not just a 
" few days , " would seem to blunt the cause-and-effect rela-
tionship between the merger breakdown and the cancellation 
suggested by Mr . Northrop. 
Also , Mr . Northrop says he could never again contact 
secretary Symington. In a May 25, 1983 letter to the 
author, Mr . Symington wrote, "That is absurd . I was always 
available to the head of any aviation company. " Later in 
this chapter we will see where Mr . Symington, as head of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, contacted Northrop Air-
craft Corporation in 1951. In a 1983 interview, Mr . 
Symington believed that he spoke then with Mr . Northrop 
himself, but could not recall that with certainty . 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid . 
4General Smith testimony , pp . 69 - 70; John K. 
Northrop testimony, pp . 281-283; Floyd B. Odlum, testimony 
before House Armed Services Committee, Investigation of the 
B- 36 Bomber Program , pp . 625 - 626 . 
5General Smith testimony, pp . 69 - 70 . 
6John K. Northrop testimony, p . 277. 
7senator Stuart Symington to the author ; letter ; 
May 20, 1983 . 
8General Smith testimony, p . 70 . 
9senator Stuart Symington ; telephone interview; 
November 17 , 1982 . On October 25, 1982 , Senator Sym~ngton 
had been contacted by the Acting Director of the Nat1onal , 
Air and Space Museum (NASM) , who had asked for the S~nator s 
comments on a section of a book scheduled to be publlshed 
by the Museum . Since the proposed text tended to support 
Mr . Northrop's charges (e.g . , "According to Jack Northrc;>p, 
considerable pressure was brought to bear on him by Symlngton 
to merge with Convair.") , Senator Symington responded 
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vigorously and quickly . In a November 4 letter {copies of 
which went to current Northrop Chairman Thomas v. Jones and 
to the author) , he chal lenged Mr . Northrop's recollections 
and criticized the NASM for believing them . NASM subse- ' 
quently changed the text: see followup letter, Senator 
Symington to Mr . Walter Boyne, Acting Director, National 
Air and Space Museum; January 7, 1983 . 
10Gen . Elwood P . Quesada {USAF, Retired) , inter-
viewed by the author at the United States Air Force Academy, 
Colorado ; April 7, 1983 . 
11 . { Gen. Curt1s E . LeMay USAF , Retired), interviewed by 
the author at Newport Beach , California ; September 29 , 1982. 
12senator Stuart Symington, interviewed by the author 
at New Canaan , Connecticut; June 6, 1 983 . 
13
rbid. 
14senator Symington letter , May 20 , 1983 . 
15General Quesada i nterview . 
16Gen. Lauris Norstad {USAF, Retired), telephone inter-
view ; January 31 , 1983 . 
17 Senator Symington interview . 
18senator Symington telephone interview . See also his 
letter to Mr . Boyne, November 4, 1982 . 
19senator Symington interview . He.w~uld.not ~erm~t 
the disgruntl ed manufacturer to be ident1f1ed 1n th1s dls-
ser tation , except to say that it was not Mr. Northrop. 
20General Norstad telephone interview . 
21
rbid. 
22General LeMay interview . 
23 Ibid . 
24senator Symington telephone interview . See also 
his letter to Mr . Boyne, November 4, 1982. 
25General Norstad te lephone interview . 
26General Quesada interview. 
27 . General LeMay interv1ew . 
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28 Thomas V. Jones , Chairman of the Board of Northrop 
corporation, telephone interview ; November 4 , 1983 . 
29 rbid . 
30 secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington , testi-
mony before House Armed Services Committee, Investigation of 
the B-36 Bomber Program, p. 242 . 
CHAPTER VIII 
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE OF THE FLYING WINGS: 
THE AIR FORCE PERSPECTIVE 
We have seen, then, that political chicanery was 
apparently not a significant factor in the demise of the 
Flying Wing. Rather , the dec is ion to cancel the thirty 
RB- 49s resulted largely from the interaction of three devel -
opments, all in late 1948 : the dramatic improvement of the 
competing B- 36 , the arrival of General LeMay as Commander of 
SAC, and President Truman ' s slashing of the Fiscal Year 1950 
defense budget . 
The significance of these three factors should not be 
especially controversial . The B- 36 proved itself throughout 
the 1950 ' s as SAC ' s first-line bomber , until finally sup-
planted by the B-52 in early 1959 . 1 It was far from a 
perfect aircraft , but as Genera l LeMay po inted out earlier , 
it would have done the job at the time . Likewise, the 
effect of General LeMay's arrival at SAC is clear : far more 
than his predecessor , General Kenney, he believed in the 
B- 36 , and was willing to give up other systems, like the 
RB-49, to get it . Finally, the effect of President Truman's 
budget cuts is undeniable : instead of continuing its buildup 
from forty-eight through fifty- nine to seventy groups, the 
newly established Air Force had to r everse course , dropping 
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back to forty-eight combat units. The airplanes that would 
have provided the backbone of the enlarged force became 
expendable . 
There exists , however, a fourth dimension to the 
problem, perhaps not as significant as the three main 
factors , but far more controversial. That dimension con-
cerns the technical performance of the Flying Wing . was it 
a safe , effective aircraft design , capable of playing a use-
ful role in America's strategic deterrent force? Or was the 
Flying Wing an unproven experiment , hazardous and not very 
useful, and unfit for routine operation? 
To answer these questions from the Air Force's per-
spective, I went to the experts . For questions concerning 
aircraft stability and flying characteristics , the two pri-
mary Air Force test pilots for the YB-49 were most helpful . 
On questions of utility- - i . e . , could the Flying Wings do the 
jobs that needed to be done?--General LeMay's insights were 
most informative . The beliefs and comments of these men go 
a long way toward explaining more of the real reasons for 
the cancellation of the Flying Wing. 
Stability and Flight Characteristics 
No aspect of the Flying Wing story has generated more 
disagreement and contention than the question of the air-
craft ' s stability . we have seen, for example, that while 
the Northrop people rated the stall characteristics of the 
YB- 49 acceptable, at least one of the Air Force pilots who 
died in the 1948 crash was reluctant to even attempt the 
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stalls scheduled on the day of the fatal accident . 
Not surprisingly , J ohn Northrop was convinced of the 
stability of the Flying Wing bombers . In a May, 1947 speech 
before the Royal Aeronaut i cal Society , he said : 
The second basic.requirement is that the all-wing 
aeroplane be d~s~gned to have sufficient stability 
and controllablllty for practical operation as a 
military or commercial aeroplane . We believe this 
requirement has been fully met by hundreds of 
flig~ts compl~ted with.thi~ type, and ~e are fully 
conv1nced of 1ts pract1cab1 l ity . ... 
Northrop ' s engineers were equally convinced of the 
Flying Wing ' s stability . D. G. McNeal , who by 1980 was 
Northrop's Advanced Aircraft Production Group manager, said 
of his involvement with t he Wing : "We believed in it .. .. 
No questions ." 3 Hugo R. Pink, later manager of 
Northrop ' s Test and Eval uation Group , was more reserved , but 
still confident : 
The airplane needed a stabi l ity a ugmenter , and o ne 
was being developed and was quite successful before 
the program was cancelled. So the problem the air -
plane had , had been solved . And , of course , with 
the eq~ipment we have today , it wou l d be "duck 
soup. " 
It was not on l y the engineers at Northrop who believed 
in the Flying Wing ' s performance : Northrop's test pilot, Max 
Stanley , was a believer as well . For KCET reporter Roberts , 
Mr . Stanley outlined his opinions about the Flying Wing: 
I flew the Flying Wing , both the B-35 and the B~49, 
f r om the first flight of each airp l ane through 1ts 
entire program and I felt that the airplanes c~uld 
be described as normal airplanes . . . no spec1al 
skills were nee ded , and I thought it was just a 
very fine flying machine . . · · . . . . 
The airplane ~ somewhat def~c1ent 1~ dlrec-
tional stability . However , the Mlnneapolls- Honey-
wel l people developed what we called "Little Herbert" , 
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a stability ~ugmentation system , that · 
corrected th1s problem . .. . J essentlally 
So the picture painted by the Northrop people is one 
of a generally acceptable aircraft with only minor stability 
problems , and even those were solved by the "Little Herbert" 
system . But a study of the Air Force pilots ' opinions will 
provide a very different viewpoint. 
The Air Force Perspective 
Retired Brig. Gen . Robert L. Cardenas was the primary 
Air Force test pilot throughout most of the Flying Wing 
bomber development. He had great affection for the YB-49 , 
and great respect for Mr . Northrop ' s genius, although the 
YB-4 9 has continued to affect his life in ways not always 
positive . In a 1983 letter to the author, General Cardenas 
wrote : 
I was the Air Force test pilot on the XB- 35 and the 
YB-49,-a5 well as the forerunner , the N-9M . I have 
also been hounded and badgered by dozens of maga-
zine , book , and history writers for ever 30 years , 
who have all tried to unravel the "Wing" mystery . 
They have all had an axe to g6ind, some pro-Northrop, 
some pro- civilian government . 
What did Genera l Cardenas think about the stability of 
the YB-49? In the KCET-TV interview , he told Mr . Roberts : 
I ' ve got to make clear that I never said it was un-
stable . It was marginally stable - -stable, not un-
stable--about the vertical 'xis, or yaw, and about 
the lateral axis , or pitch. 
What about the Northrop contention that a stability 
augmentat ion device had already solved those problems? 
First , "Little Herbert " only took care of the yaw problems, 
8 
not the tendency to pitch up and down . Further , 
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"Little Herbert" was too primitive; better systems needed to 
be developed : 
The R & D [resear~h and development] program would 
have had to be.orl.ent~d .towards the development 
of w~at " now ~x1.sts, d1.g1tal flight control, "fly-
by-wl.re , .wh1.ch was not capable of being developed 
at that t1me . In other words, Mr . Northrop had a 
beautiful concept that w~s probably twenty years 
ahead of its time ... . 
So , General Cardenas appears to side with Northrop's 
Mr . Pink, who said that with today's equipment, the solv-
ing of the YB-49's stability problem would be "duck soup" . 
But the point is really moot : to critique a 1949 decision, 
using information based on aeronautical developments of the 
1970 ' s, is a pointless exercise . As General Cardenas point-
ed out in his 1983 letter: 
I must also remind you that this was a decade . .. 
that , pushed to the wall by World War I I , had taken 
us from low sub-sonic propeller aircraft to jets to 
super - sonic rocket a ircraft- -all in ten years! Put 
yourself in . . . that timeframe when we had the 
engines , the airframes , and the guts to fly all 
those products of a beautiful era--but no electronic 
" fly-by-wire" flight control systems! Today the 
[General Dynamics] F- 16 was designed unstable to 
allow it to jerk square corners , but it has the type 
of co£0rol system in the 80's that we needed in the 40's . 
Another Pilot ' s View 
In April 1949 , three months after the cancellation of 
the RB-49 order , then-Major Cardenas was replaced as the Air 
Force's chief Flying wing pilot . The new pilot, also an Air 
Force major, was Russ Schleeh , who had been the eyewitness 
11 
to the first YB - 49 crash less than a year before . 
Then- Major schleeh remained the chief YB- 49 test pilot 
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until he was badly injured in the crash of the only remain-
ing YB-49 on March 15, 1950 . Like General Cardenas, Colonel 
schleeh was a strong backer of the Flying Wing, despite its 
problems : 
There is no question that the Flying Wing . . . was 
a tremendous accomplishment and was responsible for 
many firsts . I think it was most unfortunate that 
the B-49.pr~gram was not kept as a development pro-
gram unt1} 21ts numerous problems could have been 
resolved . 
What , according to Colonel Schleeh, were the "numerous 
problems " that needed to be solved? First, and most impor-
tant , was stability. In the KCET- TV interview, Colonel 
Schleeh ' s comments on stability were brief: " From a sta-
bility standpoint , it still needed further development. " 13 
In a 1983 interview , Colonel Schleeh elaborated: 
In rough air , because it was so short- coupled, any 
kind of gust would make the nose pitch way up , or 
way down . A modern stability augmenter would have 
taken care of that , but "Little Herbert" only con-
trolled some of the yaw, none of the pitch . It 1 ~rob­
ably wasn ' t dangerous, just real uncomfortable . 
More serious problems affected the YB-49 in stalls: 
I never did an official stall program , just one or 
two to satisfy my curiosity. But a stall was not 
a pleasant maneuver, and you ran into all kinds of 
problems . Because it had no vertical surfaces , it 
would fall off to one side or the other as you ap-
proached the stall . As you ' d go sideways, at about 
40 degrees of crossflow , it would then whip over in-
to a spin , which itself was a terrific l~ttle sur-
prise. . . It was not an acceptable a1rplane , 
period. 15 
From the standpoint of stability and performance, 
then, it appears that both Air Force pilots harbored serious 
doubts about the YB-49, and t hat those doubts were never re-
solved . Both pilots are of the opinion that , given enough 
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time and money, the problems could have been solved . But as 
to how much time, how much money would have been needed, no 
one can ever know . And had the stability prob lems been 
solved, would the B-49 series have been successful? Colonel 
schleeh thinks not : 
Probably most of the B-49 ' s deficiencies could have 
~een corrected ; but even so , it is my opinion that 
1t would not have b~en competitive with the jet 
bombers of that per1od . . . . The aerodynamics of 
the YB-49, which were basica lly those of a 400 mph 
airplane designed for piston engine performance, 
could not compete with the aerodynam ics gf an air-
craft designed for jet-age per formance . 1 
Another Debate : Performance as 
a Bombing Platform 
As with the issue of stability , the performance of the 
Flying Wing as a bomber is a controversial issue . We saw in 
Chapter IV that when flown in competition with the B-29 , 
bomb runs took four times as l ong with the YB- 49, and accur-
acy was only half as good . Why , then , did reporter Clete 
Roberts s ay that the YB-49 had proven itself as the suc-
cessor to the B-2 9? Max Stanley backed up the claim that 
the YB-49 had been deemed by the Air Force to be a suitable 
bomber: 
I think when you talk about the a i rplane be~ng ~ 
suitable bombing platform , you should keep 1n m1nd 
that it was subjected to a very intense seri~s of 
tests to determine its s uitability as a bomb1ng 
platform. It was flown by the Northrop pilots a~d 
the military pilots and the concl~sion was that 1t l7 
was a suitable bombing platform, 1t ~ acceptable . 
But once again , the Air Force viewpoint is different. 
General Cardenas flew the first Air Force bomb runs with t he 
YB-49 in l ate 1948; hi s bombardier was a Major Williams, who 
gave this account of the first tests , all done without an 
autopilot : 
An experienced bombardier who has dropped a great 
d~al.of bom~s from.this airplane would have a very 
dlfflcult tlme maklng a satisfactory bomb run in 
less than four minutes. On no two occasions were 
the altitude and airspeed constant during the 
bombing runs. It is impossible to keep the bubbles 
on the bombsight level, nor is it possible to 
synchronize the rate and turn knobs due to the 
yawing and pitching of the aircraft . On several 
occasions the bombs were released while the air-
plane was in a skid and t£g ... error (was] 
approximately 3 ,000 feet . 
His phraseology may have been awkward, but Major 
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Williams certainly got his point across . He went on to ex-
plain that the B- 29 drops under identical conditions were 
twice as accurate , while requiring only about one-fourth the 
time on the bomb run. The pilot, Major Cardenas, went on to 
make five specific recommendations, all of them involving 
significant changes to the aircraft . The first change 
recommended by Major Cardenas involved installation of a 
"satisfactory autopilot . " 19 
So "Little Herbert" was installed. A new series of 
tests to evaluate the YB- 49's bombing ability was conducted 
in April and June 1949, by which time Major Cardenas had 
been replaced as chief test pilot by Major Schleeh : 
During the months of April and Jun~ in 1949~ I flew 
the airplane eleven times, evaluatlng.the alrcraft 
as a bombing platform both with and wlthout the20 
autopilot. The bombing results were very poor . 
While "Little Herbert " had helped the yawing behavior, 
the YB-49 still had its problem of pitching up and down . 
Th . the tendency of the bombs, shown ls was exacerbated by 
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clearly in photos taken from a chase plane, to themselves 
pitch and tumble before leaving the bomb bay . 21 Exactly 
what caused the poor accuracy remained a mystery to Colonel 
Schleeh : 
I never really knew what exactly caused the in-
accuracy7 Norma l ly, you get better accuracy with 
an autop1lot than you do by flying manually, but 
not in this case : We could bomb 2~anually as well as we could with the autopilot. 
But what of Max Stanley ' s claim that after intensive 
tests , the Air Force declared the YB-49 an "acceptable " 
bombing platform? None of the Air Force records I could 
locate supported this contention : in no case was the YB- 49 
ever deemed acceptable in its then- current configuration . 
Colonel Schleeh, when asked about the YB-49 ' s acceptability 
as a bomber , was adamant : 
I never said i t was acceptable , and none of us who 
flew bombers and knew bombing ever said it was an 
acceptable bombing platform . You could drop a 
bomb with it, but it wasn ' t ~3arly as good as the 
other airplanes of that day . 
Another Perspective : Performance from 
the User' s Point of View 
When General LeMay assessed the Strategic Air 
Command ' s strength in late 1948, he saw that existing war 
plans relied heavily on forward staging bases: the relative-
ly short ranges of the B-29 and B-50 left no other choice . 
But he was reluctant to continue to rely on the foreign 
bases , for at least two reasons . First , foreign leaders 
could always deny SAC permission to use the facilities . 
Second , the closer the bases were to the Soviet Union, the 
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more vulnerable they were to attack . 24 
Thus, General LeMay started to restructure SAC based 
on a single , primary principle : "the fundamental goal of the 
Air Force should be the creation of a strategic atomic 
striking force capable of striking any target in Eurasia 
from bases in the United States and returning to the points 
25 
of takeoff." Interviewed in 1982, General LeMay reaf-
firmed his rationale: 
Well , our most likely enemy was the Soviet Union . 
As I remember, this was before we had NATO so our 
possible bases were limited, or really unknown, so 
we wouldn ' t know what we might have . We might have 
had to go there from here . Anyway, we needed ~6 
long-ranged an airplane as we could get .... 
Once this line of r easoning had been accepted within 
SAC , all hope for the Flying Wing was gone . There were 
only two ways to get the range General LeMay wanted . The 
first was to build the range into the airplane , by including 
cavernous fuel tanks in the wings and fuselage ; this was the 
principle used in the B-36. The second method, just becom-
ing practical in the years around 1950, involved aerial re-
fueling , in which a '' tanker" aircraft would replenish the 
bomber's fuel supply in flight; this was the principle 
behind Boeing ' s B-47, and virtually every other military 
aircraft since . 
But the Flying Wing was incapable of utilizing either 
approach . With an empty weight only a bit more than half 
that of the B-36, it was too small to compete with the B-36 
in self-contained fuel . It had been designed before air 
refueling was practical, so it could not compete with the 
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short-ranged but refuelable B-47. Even had it been possible 
to add air refueling capability, the B-49 ' s tendency to 
pitch up and down would have made it an unlikely prospect 
for the delicate duet which needs to take place between a 
refueling tanker and bomber . 
Interviewed in 1982, General LeMay confirmed that all 
these factors worked against the B-49 series . He similarly 
dismissed the current comments that the Wing ' s shape makes 
it an ideal "stealth" airplane, since the absence of sharp 
corners and vertical surfaces reduce the reflection of radar 
energy : at that time, he said, the generally accepted count-
er to radar was to fly higher . Only after the downing of 
Gary Powers' U-2 in 1960 did the strategy of "the higher, 
the better " come into doubt. In addition, 
looking back on it now, this thing had control 
problems, and they said it had to be a thick wing, 
so we would never have gotten the performance out 
of it . We ' d gone to thick wings before . . . . We 
never would have 2~ot supersonic with an airplane of that sort . ... 
Looking back, did he , like the test pilots, wish that the 
program had been kept alive? No, not really: 
Of course , you ' ve got to go back and try to put 
yourself into what we knew, what th~ sta~e o~ the 
art was at the time . .. but I don t thln~ lt [t~e 
canc2~lation] was a bad decision even look1ng at lt 
now . 
Conclusion 
It is to be expected that the Air Force participants 
in the Flying Wing story have a much different perspective 
than their Northrop counterparts . But two things are clear. 
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The first is that the Flying Wing has to be viewed as a 
complete system . To say, as the Northrop people do, that 
the YB-49 was a great airplane except for the stability 
problem is a bit like saying that the mythical Icarus was a 
great flier, except for this minor difficulty with over-
heating. A similar situation exists with the Wing's 
capacity as a bomber . An otherwise great aviation achieve-
ment appears to have been hampered by practical, basic 
considerations: no one wanted a bomber that couldn't bomb, 
or one that couldn ' t reach its targets. 
The second point that seems clear, though, is that the 
Air Force people involved in the Flying Wing project shared 
the affection and pride of their Northrop associates. While 
General Cardenas and Colonel Schleeh feel strongly that the 
YB-49 was in no way ready for full - scale production , both 
men expressed regret that the developmental test program was 
halted. General Cardenas, who himself tended to believe Mr. 
Northrop's charges, expressed a fatalistic trust that the 
Flying Wing will return : 
What ' s done is done, and it should remain done . 
Why resurrect old ghosts? Let new technology and 
new aircraft design orove the point of efficacy of 
W. . f 2'.::1 1ng-type a1rcra t. 
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CHAPTER IX 
"THE FLYING WING--WHAT HAPPENED TO IT? ": 
A CRITICAL REVIEW 
In this chapter, I will analyze essential portions of 
the KCET-TV documentary "The Flying Wing--What Happened to 
It?" in an attempt to clarify certain aspects of the cancel-
lation decision . In so doing, I am returning to the origin 
of my own involvement , because it was this documentary which 
sparked my study of the entire Flying Wing program . 
When ''The Flying Wing--What Happened to It? " was aired 
in December , 1980, I was a staff officer in the Strategic 
Air Command , working on a number of bomber improvement pro-
grams , most involving the aging B-52 . The show immediately 
captured my attention : if Mr . Northrop, Mr . Millar and Mr . 
Roberts were right (as I then believed they were), a corrupt 
and unethical decision had apparently shaped the course of 
aviation development, especially bomber development , for 
perhaps the rest of the century . Certainly the charges de-
served to be explored more fully than could be done in a 
brief half- hour documentary. I believed then that a deeper 
investigation, especia l ly one that looked at the Air Force 
side of the controversy , would prove worthwhile . 
That , then , was the context in which this investiga-
tion was begun . Obviously, my findings as detailed in the 
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previous chapters have led me to conclude that my original 
beliefs were wrong. In reaching that conclusion, I have 
also come to believe that the KCET documentary was excep-
tionally incomplete and inaccurate . Some of the inaccur-
acies were errors of omission: for example, Mr. Roberts 
neglected to even mention the devastating effects of Presi-
dent Truman's budget cuts, nor did he address the improve-
ment of the competing B- 36 . Also not discussed were the 
meetings of the Senior Officers Board just prior to the 
cancellation , and the desire of SAC and its Commander, 
General LeMay , to acquire the B-36 . Other negative aspects 
of the Flying Wing , like the Forbes/Edwards crash, and the 
YB-49's short range , and its doubtful in-flight stability, 
were either glossed over or not mentioned at all . 
Other inaccuracies in the documentary clearly grew 
from the frailty of human memory. Some errors were not 
terribly significant : for example , Mr . Northrop forcefully 
described getting the order for thirty-five airplanes, but 
the order was really for thirty. He also referred to a 
fatal crash in the B-35 program, but the only such crash of 
the full-size Wings involved not the B-35 but the Forbes/ 
Edwards YB- 49. In other areas , though, the effects of Mr . 
Northrop ' s apparently flawed recollections are more impor-
tant : for example, we have seen his claim that the fateful 
July 1948 meeting was ordered by the Air Force , while the 
records show convincingly that the instigator of the meet-
ing was Mr. Northrop himself . 
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If the only errors in "The Flying Wing--What Happened 
t It ?" were the afo t· o remen loned flaws of omission and mem-
ory, one could probably not be too cr1·t1·cal . f A ter all, Mr. 
Roberts closed his "expose" · th Wl something of a disclaimer, 
acknowledging that "one has the feeling that only the sur-
face has been scratched in the story of the B-49 ' Flying 
Wing . ' " 1 But there are other flaws in the documentary, 
flaws far more serious than the omissions and misrecollec-
tions cited above . The purpose of this chapter is to use 
several of the more dubious statements in the KCET show as a 
framewo r k for spotlighting some of the misconceptions about 
the whole Flying Wing situation . 
"Editoria l Fairness " and Senator Symington's 
Real Response 
In " The Flying Wing- -What Happened to I t? " it appeared 
that Senator Symington was offered a chance to make an on-
camera rebuttal to the charges against him, and that he 
elected not to do so . In explaining the Senator's non-
participation, KCET showed an exceptional l y unf l attering 
photograph of the Senator , while Mr . Roberts narrated the 
following : 
The villain in the death and destruction of the B-49 
Fl ying Wing, according to John Northrop and ~ichard 
Millar , would be the then-Secretary of the Alr Force 
Stuart Symington . Editorial fairness dema~ds ~hat Mr . 
Symington tell his side of the story at th1s t1me . 
We invited him to do so. Speaking to us only t~rough 
his secretary , the former Air Force civ~lia~ ch1ef _ 
said that he ' never did that sorz of thlng, and de 
clined to appear in this report . 
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But did he really decline to appear? According to 
senator Symington, he was never asked . In a 1982 telephone 
interview, he explained that while he then lived in New 
canaan, Connecticut, he still maintained a Washington, D.C . 
office, staffed by his long-time secretary . According to 
Senator Symington , his secretary received a call from Calif-
ornia asking for his comment on Mr . Northrop's allegations 
regarding the Flying Wing cancellation . She apparently re-
plied that " the Senator never did that sort of thing, " but 
would get a message to him . But the message seemed unimpor-
tant to Senator Symington, so he disregarded it : 
I live in New Canaan, Connecticut. I keep an office 
in New York, and this one in Washington , but I'm 
rarely here . Somebody from California called, but 
the message didn ' t make any sense to me . I was a 
Senator for twenty- four years: weird message3 come 
in all the time. I never returned the call . 
Thus , what may simply have been a secretary ' s loyal 
defense of her long- time boss was represented as an unwill-
ingness on the part of the Senator to respond . The viewer 
was left with the clear impression that Senator Symington 
was either afraid or unwilling to risk a confrontation with 
his accusers. But that was apparently not the case: in a 
later interview , he confirmed that he was not even aware of 
Mr . Northrop ' s charges until long after the KCET show was 
aired . 4 
The Purported Destruction of "Every Last 
One" of the Flying Wings 
One aspect of the cancellation is pointed to by 
h to "prove" the Air Northrop supporters , more than any ot er , 
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Force's vindictiveness : the complete destruction of all the 
Flying Wings supposedly ordered by the Air Force. Reporter 
Clete Roberts gave new voice to the charges in the KCET 
broadcast: 
[S)uddenly the contracts for the Flying Wings 
were cancelled . The aircraft themselves, every last 
one of them , were ordered destroyed, and the order 
came from the U.S . government . And they were des-
troyed, each and every one of them . 5 ----
The simple fact is that Mr . Roberts was wrong . True, 
orders were given to scrap most of the planes at the 
Hawthorne plant , but even that permitted two of the giant 
Wings to survive . We have seen that the surviving YB-49 
continued to fly until it crashed on March 15, 1950, more 
than a year after the cancellation; we have seen also that 
the lone YRB- 49 did not make its first flight until May 4, 
1950, and that it survived until late 1953 , when it was 
apparently scrapped as an abandoned derelict at Ontario , 
California. 
Mr . Millar gave a similar , but somewhat more accurate, 
account. Note that he did not say that all the Wings were 
ordered destroyed , only those seven still on the Northrop 
ramp: 
As part of the cancellation, instructions were issued 
to destroy the seven airplanes on the a~ron of the 
plant . Those airplanes were destroyed 1n front of 
the employees and everybody who had their heart and 
soul in them . No reason was given . .No,ex-
planation was forthcoming ~s to why they d1dn t save 
at least one or two . . · · 
But of course two- -the YB-49 and YRB-49--~ saved . 
And while it was unfortunate that the seven airplanes were 
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scrapped in the presence of those who had built them, was 
there a better alternative? On February 25 , 1949 , the Air 
Force estimated that the dismantling of the seven planes 
still at Northrop would save $7 , 500 , 000 , compared to the 
cost of making them flyable . 7 Should the Air Force have 
spent those millions to make the Wings flyable , so they 
cou l d be dismantled at some other location? Rather 
obviously, the decision was an economic one : the Air Force 
could not justify spending any more money (beyond that which 
was to be spent on the continued t ests of the YB-49 and 
YRB- 49) on a project that had finally reached a dead end . 
Museum Pieces 
In his documentary, Mr . Roberts pointed out that the 
Air Force's destruction of the Wings was so complete that 
even the two major aviation museums in the United States 
don't have any : 
. And they were destroyed , each and every one 
of them . There-rs-no example of the B-49 Fly ing 
Wing in t he Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson 
Air Force Base, nor is t§ere an example in the 
Smithsonian Institution . 
Of course there is no B- 49 in the museums : only two 
were built and they both crashed . (The first prototype 
Flying Wing , the N-lM, did survive and is now being restored 
by the Smithsonian; one of the three larger N- 9M scale 
models still exists , and is being rebuilt by a museum in 
Chino, California. Neither of these was apparently deemed 
worthy of mention i n the KCET documentary.) But is the fact 
that t he f ull-s i zed Wings were not saved by the Air Force 
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Museum significant? 
We have seen earlier that at least seven aircraft 
types, including the RB-49, were cancelled by the Senior 
Officers Board in early 1949 : North American•s B-45 and 
F-93; Northrop •s C-125 and RB-49; Consol i dated•s YT- 32 ; 
Kellett •s H- 10; and Boeing •s B/RB- 54 . 9 Of those air-
craft , only one was already operational--the B-45-- and it 
is the only one on display in the Air Force Museum today . 
All the rest were cancelled before going to their using 
commands; none of them is represented at the Museum . 10 
Thus , the fact that no Flying Wing is in the Air Force 
Museum cannot be construed as a sign of the Air Force•s vin-
dictiveness . The current director explained to the author 
in 1981 that the Museum emphasis has always been on opera-
tional Air Force aircraft, rather than on unique and inter-
esting evolutionary cul-de-sacs; as he bluntly put it, 
u 1 • k h h u11 We re not runnlng a frea s ow ere . 
What the Decision-Makers Knew 
In retrospect, with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, 
the decision to scrap the Wings at the Northrop plant cer-
tainly appears regrettable . But before condemning those who 
issued the destruction orders, we must try to put ourselves 
in their position . Studies in August of 1948 had estimated 
· 1 11 pickle 11 (i e the cost of the cheapest option--to slmp Y · ., 
Unt;l their problems could be preserve) and store the planes k 
12 Further, to make the air-fixed--would be $2,500 ,000 . 
0 00 0 13 The decision-craft flyable would cost $7 , 50 , · 
123 
makers knew that the YB-49 was in flight test, and that the 
YRB-49 assembly and flight test would continue. With this 
information , we can see that the decision to scrap the air-
planes was not vindictive or malevolent : if the Air Force 
leaders really wanted to destroy the Flying Wings, wouldn't 
they have destroyed the YB- 49 at Edwards and the YRB-49 at 
Hawthorne? Would they have allowed the YB-49's subsequent 
appearance at a 1949 Washington air show? And would they 
have allowed the YRB-49 to be completed and entered into a 
new flight test program in 1950? Should we blame the 1949 
decision-makers for the 1950 crash of the remaining YB-49, 
and for the 1953 destruction of the abandoned YRB-49? 
The answers to these questions are obvious , and the 
conclusion to be drawn is obvious as well : the decision to 
destroy the Flying Wings at the Northrop plant appears 
tragic, viewed from our perspective thirty-f i ve years later . 
But when we analyze the decision from a 1949 vantage point, 
it becomes clear that the chosen course of action was the 
logical and cost-effective one at the time. 
A Suitable Replacement for the B-29? 
In describing the Flying Wing in the opening minutes 
of the KCET broadcast , Mr . Roberts stated: 
[The YB-49] was the product of the genius of John 
K. Northrop and his crew of engineers , who ~ad 
brought it to a point of development where ~t had 
been selected by the United States Air Force as the 
next generation bomber , the replacemen~ for the 14 
B-29 which had carried the air war aga~nst Japan. 
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My research yielded not one bit of evidence that would 
support this statement . We have seen General Arnold's tes-
timony, in which he explained how the ten-thousand-pound-
payload/ten-thousand-mile- range airplane was the logical 
successor to the B-29 . And it is true that the XB-35 and 
XB- 36 were ordered with the expectation (or at least the 
hope) that at least one of them would prove a suitable 
successor t o the B-29 . But we have also seen that the XB-35 
was a near-total failure , primarily due to the ill-conceived 
propulsion system. 
With the failure of the XB-35, the future of the Fly-
ing Wing bomber rested on the jet- powered conversion, the 
much shorter-ranged YB-49 . But we have seen that, like its 
propeller-driven predecessor , the YB-49 suffered from its 
share of problems . Those problems have been detailed in 
earlier parts of this dissertation , but the bottom line 
deserves to be repeated : never was the YB-49 judged by the 
Air Force to be a suitable bomber, and never was it 
"selected by the United States Air Force as the next 
generation bomber , the replacement for the B-29." 
A "Flyoff " Against the B-36? 
Also misrepresented in the KCET show was the idea that 
there was a head-to-head competition between the YB-49 and 
Convair's B-3 6 . In Mr. Roberts' words: 
[The YB- 49] flew in competition with thr~e aircraft, 
the B- 36s, and it won the flyoff . · · · 
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Such a " flyoff " connotes a situation · · 1 s1m1 ar to the 
1970's "fly before you buy" concept, in which multiple manu-
facturers built aircraft to the same set of spec ' £ ' t' 1 1ca 1ons, 
and then the competitive prototypes were flown on identical 
missions to see which performed best. 16 But no such 
situation existed with the B- 36 and the YB-49: performance 
characteristics were completely different, the main discrep-
ancies being in range and bomb capacity . The B-36 was 
classed by SAC as a "heavy" bomber; 17 the YB-49 was a 
"medium" bomber. 18 We have seen the B- 36 had a range 
approaching ten thousand miles ; the YB-49 range was about 
half of that . We have seen also that the B-36 could carry 
84,000 pounds of bombs; the YB- 49 couldn't come close to 
that amount . 
There was, of course, a kind of competition between 
the B- 36 and the Flying Wings , but it was based solely on 
budgetary, not performance-related, considerations. In much 
the same way that today's B- 1 competes against the M-X mis-
sile for scarce dol l ars, so the B- 49 series competed against 
the B- 36 ; every dollar spent on the B-36 was a dollar un-
available for spending on the B-49 and other airplanes . 
to claim that the YB-49 "won the flyoff " against the B- 36 
But 
suggests that both aircraft were capable of performing the 
Strategic Air Command ' s mission and that the YB-49 was 
simply judged to be better . such a suggestion is totally 
without foundation . 
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Conclusion 
There are other inaccuracies in "The Flying Wing--
What Happened to It? " , less significant than the ones de-
tailed above . But what emerges from an analysis of the 
show ' s errors is perhaps more disconcerting than the errors 
themselves. There are so many mistakes , so many omissions, 
so many misleading statements, that the analyst is obliged 
to ask : Just what was the purpose of the KCET broadcast? 
was it a good- faith effort to allow an old and dying man to 
express the beliefs he had held secretly for thirty-five 
years? Was it an attempt to ruin the reputation of a long-
time public servant? Or was it something in between : an 
effort, perhaps, to stir up a dormant controversy, in the 
hope that the truth would finally emerge? 
Whatever the purpose, it should be noted that the show 
had the effect of severely , and unjustifiably, damaging the 
reputation of Stuart Symington . In a 1983 interview, he 
expressed to the author his belief that the main thing he 
had to leave behind him was his reputation , and that that 
reputation had been unfairly and perhaps irretrievably 
19 damaged by the KCET broadcast . 
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CHAPTER X 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
This dissertation finds its meaning on two levels. 
the surface , it is a detailed case study of an important 
aircraft development program gone awry . As such, it has 
developed into a critique of the critics, and a defense of 
the decision-makers who ended the Flying Wing program 
thirty-five years ago . 
The second level of meaning is deeper, more general, 
On 
and ultimately more important . No matter how fascinating a 
case study may be , it must ultimately derive its meaning 
from its predictive ability, that is, how well the study 
allows us to project its lessons into the future. By know-
ing the lessons of the past, we can best put ourselves in 
position to avoid their repetition . 
Following , then , are some of the long-term lessons 
that can be learned from the demise of the Flying Wings . 
Importance of Marketing: Focus on the Customer 
In his 1960 article , "The Marketing Revolution" ' 
Robert J . Keith discussed the primacy of the customer : 
The consumer, not the company , is in the middle . 
In today ' s economy the consumer, the man or womant 
. th bsolute dead cen er 
who buys the product, 1s at e a. around 
of the business universe. Compan1es reyo l ve 
the customer, not the other way around . 
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Mr . Keith went on to discuss what he saw as the four 
eras that characterized the "marketing revolution" at his 
firm, the Pillsbury Company . The first era was production-
oriented, and consisted of the company ' s efforts to produce 
those goods it could fabricate well, and then to find a 
market in which to sell them . Aft 1 · 1 er evo v1ng t1rough a pair 
of intermediate stages, Mr . Keith said that, in 1960, his 
firm was on the brink of a fourth era, that of "marketing 
control. " In this stage , the facets of marketing--research, 
product development, pricing, distribution, and the like--
would dominate the firm . 2 
Other authors have since argued for the primacy of the 
customer, and thus of marketing . In his classic, Manage-
ment : Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, Peter Drucker 
emphasized that the most critical aspect of any business 
enterprise is not engineering, or technology, or a specific 
product . Rather , the focus of a business must be the 
customer, and the development and maintenance of that focus 
is the purpose of marketing : 
There is only one valid definition of business pur-
pose : to create a customer . . Because its pur-
pose is to create a customer, the business ent7r-
prise has two- -and only these two- -basi~ fu~ct1ons: 
marketing and innovation . .. . Market1ng . 1s the 
distinguishing unique function of the bus1ness .. A 
business is set apart from all other human organl-
zati~ns ~y the fact that it markets a product or a 
serv1.ce . 
On t o emphasize that being a tech-Mr . Drucker went 
nological leader is never enough by itself : a successful 
d His example is IBM, firm must remain customer-oriente · 
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which used such a customer-orientation to leapfrog 
over the 
computer industry ' s technological pacesetters: 
But while the technological leaders in the early 
computer days , Univac, GE , and RCA, were product-
focused and technology-focused, the punch card 
salesmen who ran IBM asked : "Who is the customer? 
What is value ~or him? How does he buy? And, what 
does he need? " 
In today ' s marketing-oriented business world, such 
notions seem almost common-sense . But our review of the 
history of the Flying Wing program has revealed an almost 
complete lack of the "customer focus " that Mr . Keith and Mr . 
Drucker claimed to be so essential . 
Northrop : A First- Era , Production- Oriented Firm 
It seems clear in retrospect that Northrop was totally 
oriented toward the product that it was uniquely capable of 
developing, and was, at the same time, little concerned 
about the needs of its customer . Even the genesis of the 
Flying Wing, as interpreted by pro-Northrop aviation author 
Bill Gunston, reflected the firm ' s focus on product : 
Of course, common sense shows that with small air-
craft at least a rudimentary nacelle has to be re-
tained in order for the occupant(s) to sit up-
right . . . . For this and other reasons Northrop 
decided his first saleable flying wing would have 
to be very large. Indeed, it would have to be 
either ~ big civil transport or a long-range 
bomber . 
Mr . Gunston went on to explain that the civil trans-
port would definitely be harder to sell than the bomber : the 
0 0 t 0 such a radical and 
a1rlines were too cautious to 1nves 1n 
costly venture, but the Air Corps had already proven to be 
something of an easy mark : 
In 1941, the answer was obvious The t 
0 0 • ransport 
would be much more d~ff~cult to do the 
0 0 , re was no obVlOU~ customer Wlth whom he could work and the 
marketlng problem was clearly formidable Th 0 
0 ° • e a1r-l1nes are conservat1ve, and Northrop did not 1 ° h 
the penalty of building the right product tenr~e~~s 
too soon. On t~e other hand ... the Army, having 
poured out conslderable funds for such giant bomb-
ers as the [Boeing] XB-15 and [Douglas] XB-19 
without havigg any clear idea why, was rather 
eager . 
If Northrop paid little attention to the customer ' s 
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needs at the outset , it paid even less as the project went 
along . We have seen that in every area that mattered to the 
customer, the Strategic Air Command, the Flying Wings were 
deficient. They could not carry the types and quantities of 
non- nuclear weapons necessary, and could not carry the early 
atomi c bombs at a l l . The i r ability to reach Eurasian tar-
gets was non- existent , since they had neither sufficient 
internal fuel capacity nor in- flight refueling capability . 
They were unable to deliver what bombs they could carry with 
the required accuracy , and their in-flight stability was, at 
best , doubtful . 
In areas that d i d not matter much to SAC, the Wings 
excelled . The YB/YRB- 49s were fast, but speed without the 
range to reach the target was a useless strength. The Wings 
were maneuverable , able to outfly some of the top-performing 
fighters of that day . But this, too, was a characteristic 
not highly prized . General Kenney testified in 1949 that, 
a f h dlo dn, t care about maneuver-s ormer SAC Commander , e 
.. 7 
ability "because a bomber doesn ' t maneuver in combat . 
it General LeMay also downplayed its significance : as he put 
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l·n a 1982 interview , if SAC bo b m ers were called on to go to 
the soviet Union, their aim would be to drop bombs, not 
engage the Russians in dog fights . M aneuverability did not 
matter to him at a11 . 8 
"Marketing Myopia" 
How could a successful firm , led by such a brilliant 
aircraft designer, fail so badly in the arenas of management 
and marketing? The answer may lie in the fact that the very 
qualities that l ead to success in technology and engineering 
can hamper performance in other critical areas . In his 1960 
artie le, "Marketing Myopia", Theodore Levitt described just 
such a circumstance, in which engineering geniuses are 
baffled by the inconsistencies of the marketplace : 
Having created a successful company by making a 
superior product, it is not surprising that manage-
ment continues to be oriented toward the product 
rather than the people who consume it . . . . A 
number of other factors tend to strengthen and 
sustain this belief : 
1 . Because electronic products are highly com-
plex and sophisticated, managements become top 
heavy with engineers and scientists . This creates 
a selective bias in f avor of research and produc-
tion at the expense of marketing . The organization 
tends to view itself as making things rather than 
satisfying customer needs . . . · . . 
2 . To this bias .. . is added the b1as 1n 
favor of dealing with controllable variables . En-
gineers and scientists are at home in the world of 
. 9 
concrete th1ngs . ... 
If Mr. Northrop developed a bias toward controllable 
variables , and one against the vagaries of the Air Force 
procurement process, he could hardly be blamed . The Air 
Force certainly contributed generously to the general 
misdirection which characterized the Flying Wing 's 
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development . 
mers cause : 
Mr. Levitt described the problems that custo-
consumers are unpredictable varied f' kl . 
short- sighted , stubborn, and general,lylcb teh, stupld, 
h · · t h o ersome T 1s J.S no w at the engineer-managers sa b t d · 
down in their consciousness it is what thy, bul. eeplO ey e 1eve. 
The Air Force was all that, and more. consider just 
these examples we have already seen : first, the desired 
range for the XB-35 five thousand miles, then--in a phone 
call-- it was abruptly doubled to ten thousand . In May of 
1948 , Northrop got its order for thirty RB-49s; the very 
next month, production of twenty-nine of the thirty was 
shifted to a competitor; six months later, all thirty were 
cancelled . In 1946, General Kenney had tried to cancel the 
B-36; two years later, his successor gave up other aircraft, 
including Northrop's, to raise money for more B- 36s. Add to 
these the problems caused by non- Air Force action--e .g., 
President Truman ' s FY 1950 budget cuts--and one can readily 
sympathize with the "engineer-manager's " point of view . 
Nonetheless, the research/engineering/production bias 
certainly dominated Northrop's management of the Flying Wing 
program . For nearly ten years, the underlying theme of the 
dialogue between Northrop and the Air Force is plain : the 
Air Force continually expressed concern about the practical 
features of the Wings - -range, bomb carriage and delivery, 
in-flight stability, and production rates, to name just a 
few . The Northrop Aircraft Corporation's responses were 
equally consistent: it continued to ignore, or at least 
while trumpeting the 
minimize, the Air Force's concerns, 
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wing ' s successful aspects--speed, maneuverability , and 
aeronautical achievement . Unfortunately for Northrop those 
were facets which the customer , especially SAC and General 
LeMay , valued little or not at all . 
Marketing Planning 
The well - known marketing authority, Philip Kotler, has 
argued that effective marketing demands four major planning 
skills . 11 Two of them-- pricing and distribution-- did 
not play significant roles in the demise of the Flying 
Wings . The remaining two- - product development and promo-
tion- - were central to the program 's failure. 
Product development--the need to develop an idea into 
a commodity that customers will pay for- - has been covered 
extensively in other parts of this dissertation . The last 
factor, though- -promotion--has not. If we define promotion 
as the need to reach a market and then to spur that market 
to a desired action (i . e . , buy our product), we can see that 
some of Northop's actions in that area are hard to explain . 
Promotion presupposes , of course , that the firm knows what 
its market i s , and that it stays in touch with that market 
through some f o rm of f eedback system . In 1949 , Mr. Northrop 
testified that the RB- 4 9 cancellation was "a shock · · ·' 
out of the b lue . n 12 But if he had been at all in touch 
· th Flying Wing was in Wlth his market, h e must have known e 
h B-36 in late 1948 was trouble . The rapid improvement of t e 
13 The President ' s 
well-documented in i ndustry sources . 
proposed budget c ut s were also publicly reported , as was the 
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replacement of General Kenney, no big fan of the 8_36 , by 
the pro-B-36 General LeMay . Even the existence of the 
senior Officers Board, before which General LeMay testified, 
had been a poorly-kept secret in the industry . A ccording to 
Aviation Week : 
Airc~af~ ma~ufacturers have been watching anxiously 
for 1nd1cat1ons of what a small group of top USAF 
generals have been up to for the past two weeks. 
Generals Norstad, McNarney, Craig , and Fairch i ld 
have been closeted in t he Pentagon for top secret 
meetings during thi 4holidays . The subject--air-
craft procurement . 
Given this , how the news of the cancellation could 
have come "out of the blue " to Mr. Northrop is not clear. 
Rather , it would seem that a reasonab ly well-informed, mar-
keting- oriented firm would have had at least some warning, 
perhaps enough time to try to reawaken the customer to the 
superior points of the Flying Wing . But we will see that--
for whatever reason--this did not occur . 
Promotion and Buyer Behavior 
In even the largest organizations, buying is still a 
function of individual behavior . It follows, then, that a 
fir m must target its marketing efforts toward the individual 
In decision- makers , not toward the monolithic organization . 
their artie le , "A General Model for Understanding Organiza-
tional Behavior", Frederick Webster, Jr · and Yoram Wind 
explained : 
· ro The individual is at the center of the buy1n~ P. -
cess . It is the specific individual w 0 =s 
· · · . £fort not the ab the target for the market1ng e . . ' t to 
. . 1 t 1s 1mportan stract organ1zat1on · · · · , s chological 
understand the organizational buyer s P Y 
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characteristics and especially his red· . . 
preference structure, and decision Pm d llsposltlons , 
· f k · o e as the bas1s or mar et1ng strategy decisions. 5 
So who was the individual at whom marketing efforts on 
behalf of the Flying Wing should have been aimed?. Certainly 
not Mr. Symington : in addition to his claim that he let 
military people make such decisions, we also have seen that 
the decision- model for weapon system acquisition went from 
the bottom up , not from the top down . 16 
As General Norstad put it : 
In no way did he [Mr . Symington] ever generate re-
quirements . Those came fror7me, and they came to me from the using commands . 
So we've seen that the using command, in this case 
SAC, determined aircraft requirements. It follows, then, 
that the using commander, General LeMay, should have been at 
least one of the major targets for Northrop's marketing 
effort . But in his 1949 appearance before the House Armed 
Services Committee , Mr . Northrop testified that he thought 
he had discussed the Flying Wing with General LeMay, but at 
least three years earlier , long before the General's assign-
ment to SAc . 18 This is a difficult situation to under-
stand: in late 1948 and 1949, General LeMay held the key to 
an $84,000,000 contract, and yet Mr. Northrop had not dis-
cussed it with him since 1946! When he took over the 
Strategic Air Command in october of 1948, might General 
Of Mr. Northrop ' s LeMay have had contact with other members 
f . ? Interviewed in 1982, 1rm regarding the Flying Wing . 
General LeMay recalled no discussions with Northrop people 
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about the Flying Wings. In fact, he didn't even consider 
the Wings to be among the viable contenders, 
although thirty 
of the reconnaissance models were already on 
order; perhaps 
incredibly , General LeMay never once even~ the Flying 
wings that Mr . Northrop wanted to see become the major 
component of America ' s strategic reconnaissance force : 
I don ' t think [the B- ~9] was even in the running, 
[and] the - 35 wasn't 1n the picture at all .... 
No , I never even saw t£9 things, just pictures over 
the years , that's all. 
So , Northrop ' s marketing efforts apparently did not 
include discussing the product with the one man who had 
greatest control over its fate . Further, when he appeared 
before the Senior Officers Board to argue for more B-36s at 
the expense of the RB-49 order, General LeMay had no first-
hand knowledge of the Northrop product . 
Whether one places the responsibility for this lack of 
dialogue on the manufacturer or on the Air Force, the simple 
fact remains : the Flying Wings had no support from that most 
critical quarter , the customer . 
Summary 
To understand the failure of the Flying Wing , one 
should look not in the direction of political maneuvering or 
unethical behavior , but 
concepts of marketing . 
rather toward the more prosaic 
A marketing- oriented firm would have 
determined the needs of its customer, and then built a 
being a technol-product to fulfill those needs ; Northrop, 
d 1 ped a product ogically- orien ted enterprise , instead eve 0 
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based on its own unique capabilities , and then tried to find 
a customer for that already-determined product . When the 
customer protested over a period of nearly ten years that 
the product couldn't do the job that needed to be done, a 
marketing-oriented firm would have at least paid attention; 
Northrop pressed on, minimizing the importance of the flaws 
while touting the Flying Wing ' s far less significant 
strengths . A marketing- oriented firm would have known that 
in even the largest of organizations, buying decisions are 
ultimately made by individuals, and it would have made 
efforts to favorably influence those individuals; Northrop 
did not, perhaps believing that the innovative character-
istics of the Flying Wing were enough to make , and keep, the 
sale. Finally, a marketing-oriented firm would have 
realized that a customer buys not so much a product as he 
buys utility: the B-36 , for example, with its bulbous cock-
pit, ungainly fuselage, six pusher propellers and four 
tacked-on jets, hardly qualified as a major aesthetic break-
through , but the customer didn ' t care. As General LeMay 
said, it could do the job at the time. Convair sold SAC not 
the B-36 , but rather its capability and usefulness; Northrop 
sold only the Flying Wing . 
Toward the Future 
Wing: 
Today, Northrop is again working on another Flying 
.. 20 In 
the highly classified "stealth bomber. 
t ;on is much different, other ways, though, the corpora ~ 
signs indicate that Northrop has learned much since the 
and 
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Flying Wing era of the 1940's . Management is perhaps less 
engineering-biased: the current chairman, an . 
eng1neer by 
training, started with Northrop as a planner thirty years 
ago , after leaving the Rand Corporation,· the current presi-
dent is a manufacturing expert; his predecessor was a former 
administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration.21 In addition, areas that hampered the devel-
opment of the old Flying Wings have been addressed: a 1982 
plant acquisition and other improvements valued at $200 
million will avoid the capacity constraints that hurt the 
firm in the past, 22 while advances in electronic flight 
controls are expected to negate the problems of instability 
which plagued the big bombers. The most impoitant change, 
though , is Northrop ' s development of a marketing- orienta-
tion : the stealth bomber is being developed not only because 
Northrop knows how to build it , but also because the custo-
mer (once again the Air Force, specifically SAC) needs it. 
Conclusion 
In a 1978 article in the Journal of Marketing, Derek 
Abell introduced the concept of "strategic windows" · He 
suggested that the best time to push a product is when such 
a "strategic window " is open, when there is a smooth meshing 
between the needs of the customer and the peculiar strengths 
of the producer : 
. ., . sed here to focus The term " strategic w1.ndow l.S u 1 limited 
attention on the fact tha~ there ~~~t~nb~tween the 
periods of time during wh1.ch the l. rticular 
key requirements of a market and the pa 
competenc~es o~ 3 a firm competing in that market is 
at an opt1mum . 
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Clearly such a strategic window did not exist in the 
l940's , when both Northrop ' s still-developing technology and 
the Air Force's changing requirements combined to doom the 
Flying Wing bombers . The situation today, though, promises 
to be different: the demands of the customer seem in harmony 
with the capabilities of the producer. Thirty-five years 
after the deaths of their graceful predecessors, the window 
to success for the Flying Wings may at last be open. 
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